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THE PRO-LIFE SPRING AND THE FUTURE OF ROE V. WADE 




After decades of repression of pro-life legal activity, there was an 
extraordinary harvest of pro-life legislation enacted in the United States in 
2011-2013.  It was followed, as the night follows the day, by an eruption of 
judicial rulings invalidating many of the new pro-life laws.  This article 
reviews each of the abortion decisions comprising the abortion 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States (dozens of 
decisions spread over four decades).  It traces the major themes in and 
theories that underlie the abortion jurisprudence.  It notes the checkered 
free-speech jurisprudence of the Court regarding expressions by pro-life 
critics, protesters and demonstrators.  It reviews the pro-life legislation 
passed in the pro-life Spring of 2011-13, and considers reasons for the 
flourishing of legislative efforts to protect pre-natal human life.  The 
scandal of convicted Dr. Kermit Gosnell and “house of horrors” abortion 
clinic in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and the controversy of abortion 
coverage in Obamacare have called attention to the filthy practice of 
abortion and generated responsive pro-life legislation. But judicial 
protection of abortion-on-demand will continue, as must pro-life efforts to 
stop the carnage.    
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Spring is the season in which the cold, lifeless dreariness of winter 
gives way to sunshine, warmth, extending daylight, rebirth of nature, and 
new growth. Shakespeare poetically described spring as: 
When daisies pied and violets blue 
And lady-smocks all silver-white 
And cuckoo-buds of yellow hue 
Do paint the meadows with delight, 
The cuckoo then, on every tree, 
Mocks married men; for thus sings he, 
Cuckoo; 
Cuckoo, cuckoo: Oh word of fear, 
Unpleasing to a married ear!1 
So the term “spring” has long symbolized rebirth, renewal, and 
revitalization, and is symbolically used that way in many disparate contexts.  
For example, the term “Prague Spring” is a well-known reference to a brief 
period of political liberalization in Czechoslovakia in 1968, during which 
rigid Communist regulations were relaxed or withdrawn for several months, 
until Russian military forces re-invaded the country and reestablished the 
old Communist rule and rules.2  Similarly, the term “Arab Spring” refers to 
 
1. William Shakespeare, Spring, POETRY FOUNDATION, available at 
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/182368.  A major implication of Shakespeare’s poem is 
that Spring is torment for married men because it is the season of flirting and wooing and courting 
from which married men are excluded by their marital commitments.  Another implication of 
Shakespeare’s description of the lament and sadness that Spring causes married men is that 
married women do not lament; that marriage is joy to women, as it is bondage and sorrow for men 
(at least in Springtime). That gender disparity and the reasons for it, and whether it still exists 
today might be well worth examining, but they are beyond the scope of this paper. 
2. Prague Spring, BRITANNICA ACADEMIC EDITION, available at 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/473793/Prague-Spring.  
Soon after he became first secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on Jan. 5, 
1968, [Alexander] Dubček granted the press greater freedom of expression; he also 
rehabilitated victims of political purges during the Joseph Stalin era. In April he 
promulgated a sweeping reform program that included autonomy for Slovakia, a 
revised constitution to guarantee civil rights and liberties, and plans for the 
democratization of the government. Dubček claimed that he was offering “socialism 
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a short period “of pro-democracy protests and uprisings that took place in 
the Middle East and North Africa beginning in 2010 and 2011, challenging 
some of the region’s entrenched authoritarian regimes,” but these protests 
proved as transitory as the season.3 
Three characteristics of spring make it an apt metaphor for the 
surprising flowering of pro-life legislation in the United States in 2011 
through 2013, and particularly for the pro-life laws enacted in the state of 
North Dakota in 2013.  First, spring follows a season of dark, cold, 
apparently lifelessness (dormant if not dead) winter.  Second, spring is 
filled with promise, potential, hope, and positive expectations; it is a time of 
sprouting, budding, and new growth.  Finally, spring ends; it is only a short, 
cyclical season that passes into summer, then on towards another autumn, 
and then onward to another winter.  Spring is a reminder that winter will 
come again.  But the memory of spring can sustain us in the coldest winters; 
we can enjoy roses in the winter as we remember that last spring and look 
forward to the next season of springtime. 
We have experienced a “springtime” of pro-life legislative activity for 
several years.  There has been an eruption of legislation regulating and 
restricting abortion in the past two years.  That explosion of anti-abortion 
legislation may be related to several significant and stunning scandals that 
were widely noticed by pro-life observers (albeit largely neglected by the 
media). 
There also has been an eruption of courts invalidating abortion 
restrictions in 2013, which may also directly relate to the explosion of 
publicity about abortion abuses in recent years.  When people read or hear 
about unsafe, deadly, or abusive practices, they tend to react, and legislators 
tend to react by passing laws to deter or eliminate the safety hazards and 
abuses.  This was especially apparent during the Dr. Kermit Gosnell trial.4 
The eruption of courts invalidating abortion restrictions in 2013 may 
also directly relate to the Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage decisions in 
 
with a human face.” By June many Czechs were calling for more rapid progress 
toward real democracy. Although Dubček insisted that he could control the country’s 
transformation, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries viewed the 
developments as tantamount to counterrevolution. On the evening of Aug. 20, Soviet 
armed forces invaded the country and quickly occupied it. As hard-line communists 
retook positions of power, the reforms were curtailed, and Dubček was deposed the 
following April.  Id.   
3. Arab Spring, BRITANNICA ACADEMIC EDITION, available at 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1784922/Arab-Spring (“Demonstrators expressing 
political and economic grievances faced violent crackdowns by their countries’ security forces.”).  
4. Steven Ertelt, Kermit Gosnell Receives Third Consecutive Life Term for Killing Baby, 
LIFENEWS.COM, May 15, 2013, http://www.lifenews.com/2013/05/15/kermit-gosnell-receives-
third-consecutive-life-term-for-killing-baby/. 
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United States v. Windsor5 and Hollingsworth v. Perry.6  The ethic 
underlying both the aggressive judicial invalidation of laws restricting and 
regulating abortion and the aggressive judicial invalidation of laws denying 
legal recognition to same-sex marriage is the same: it is the ethic of 
unrestrained “judicial activism.”  “Judicial activism” refers to policy-
making by judicial decision; it is legislation by judicial decree.  When 
judges undertake to establish their preferred public policies (the policies 
they would enact if they were legislators or executive order authors) they 
engage in judicial activism.  When the Supreme Court engages in judicial 
activism (as it did in Windsor and Perry) and when there are other notable 
incidents or significant incidence of lower courts engaging in judicial 
activism, it is contagious.  Other courts feel liberated to engage in judicial 
activism themselves.  So the same-sex marriage decisions of the Supreme 
Court raised the flag of judicial activism, and served as a rallying cry for 
lower courts to do the same.  Thus, it should come as no surprise that lower 
courts have invalidated the North Dakota abortion restrictions (which are at 
least unpopular with, if not offensive to, the policy values of the intellectual 
and liberal elite). 
This article begins in Part II with a review of the decades long 
repression of pro-life restrictions of abortion-on-demand.  This examination 
begins on January 22, 1973 — the date Roe v. Wade,7 and Doe v. Bolton8 
were decided — and extends through the abortion regulations enacted in 
2012 and 2013 by the North Dakota Legislature.  North Dakota has 
arguably been the leading state to push the envelope in enacting laws 
designed to prevent irresponsible and dangerous abortion practices.  Part III 
reviews the “Pro-Life Spring of 2011-2013” by summarizing legislation 
nationally and North Dakota’s remarkable legislative production.  Part IV 
looks ahead to “The Coming of Another Winter of Repression of Pro-Life 
Public Legislation and Activity.”  This section is a reminder that political 
seasons, like climatic seasons, change and that it is wise to plan for such 
changes when seeking to enact pro-life laws.  Part V contains the 
conclusion, which reminds us that we may have roses in winter by planning 
ahead. 
 
5. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
6. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
8. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
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II. THE WINTER OF ROE V. WADE AND DECADES OF 
REPRESSION OF EFFORTS TO PROTECT PRE-NATAL HUMAN 
LIFE 
Between 1973 and 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States 
rendered decisions in at least thirty-six major abortion cases, (cases dealing 
with abortion restrictions and regulations)9 and at least ten other secondary 
or collateral abortion cases that effectively invalidated all significant 
restrictions upon or regulations of elective abortion on demand.10  The 
Court struck down prohibitions of abortion, restrictions of abortion, and 
regulations of abortion dealing with adult women, married women, single 
women, husbands and fathers, daughters and parents, informed consent, 
parental and spousal consent, parental and spousal notification, disposal of 
fetal remains, public funding of abortion, pro-life protests against abortion, 
pro-life speech, and every over conceivable type of abortion regulation. 
The history of Supreme Court abortion litigation dates from 1971.  In 
United States v. Vuitch,11 the Supreme Court upheld a District of Columbia 
abortion law that prohibited all abortions “except those necessary for the 
preservation of the mother’s life.”12  A lower federal court had dismissed 
the prosecution of a doctor accused of performing illegal abortions on the 
 
9. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); * Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, 
Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006); 
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Mazurek v. 
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997); Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997); Schenck v. Pro-
Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997); * Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 
U.S. 753 (1994); * Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994): * Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); * Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health 
Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for 
Reprod. Health, Inc., 497 U.S. 502 (1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); * 
Webster v.  Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); 
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983); Planned 
Parenthood Ass’n of  Kansas City, Mo..v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron 
Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); 
Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Bellotti v. Baird 
(II), 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 
(1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird 
(I), 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); 
Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Doe v. 
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (* indicates pro-life free speech 
or expression case).   
10. See, e.g., * Lefemine v. Wideman, 133 S.Ct. 9 (2012) (per curiam); * FEC v. Wisc. Right 
to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); * Lawson v. Murray, 525 U.S. 955 (1998); Janklow v. Planned 
Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174 (1996); * Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110 
(1995); Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996); Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 
1013 (1993); Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 484 U.S. 171 (1987); * Guste v. Jackson, 429 U.S. 399 (1977); 
Arnold v. Sendak, 429 U.S. 968 (1976); (* pro-life free speech or expression case). 
11. 402 U.S. 62 (1971). 
12. Id. at 68-71. 
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ground that the phrase “necessary” was unconstitutionally vague.13  The 
Supreme Court reversed, noting that general usage and modern 
understanding of the term within the medical profession rendered the statute 
adequately discernable.14  Thus, in its first case involving the 
constitutionality of abortion laws, the Court upheld a traditional categorical 
proscription of abortion. 
Two years later, however, in 1973, the United States Supreme Court 
did an abrupt about-face when it announced its landmark decision in Roe v. 
Wade,15 which established a woman’s right to obtain an abortion as part of 
a constitutional right of privacy.  The case involved a challenge, brought by 
an indigent, pregnant single woman, to the Texas abortion laws that 
prohibited abortions except when necessary to save the life of the mother.16  
A federal district court concluded that the Texas law was unconstitutional, 
and the Supreme Court affirmed.17 
Justice Blackmun began his opinion for the Court with the declaration 
that: “[i]t perhaps is not generally appreciated that the restrictive criminal 
abortion laws in effect in a majority of States today are of relatively recent 
vintage.”18  To support this introduction, Justice Blackmun expounded for 
approximately twenty pages his perception of the world history of abortion 
laws.  The Court then analyzed three reasons proponents of the restrictive 
abortion laws gave in support of these laws.  The first was to discourage 
extramarital sex, and neither the State of Texas nor the Court took this 
argument seriously.19  The second state interest — maternal health — 
received much more serious attention by the Court because it was argued 
that abortion was a risky medical procedure.20  The Court reasoned that the 
major motivation behind the restrictive laws was to protect a pregnant 
woman from “a procedure that placed her life in serious jeopardy.”21  The 
Court, however, concluded that this interest was not compelling because it 
found that mortality rates appeared to be lower for women undergoing 
early, legal abortions than for childbirth.22  The third reason advanced for 
laws prohibiting abortion was the protection of prenatal life.23  The Court 
 
13. Id. at 68. 
14. Id. at 71-72. 
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
16. Id. at 117-18. 
17. Id. at 167. 
18. Id. at 129. 
19. Id. at 148. 
20. Id. at 148-49. 
21. Id. at 149.at 149. 
22. Id. at 149-150, 163. 
23. Id. at 150. 
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suggested, however, that the major purpose of abortion laws was merely to 
protect the pregnant woman, not the fetus.24  The Court further opined that, 
because philosophers and theologians were still debating about when life 
begins, the interest in protecting prenatal life did not justify laws 
prohibiting abortion.25  Consequently, the Court held: 
This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon 
state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in 
the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people, is 
broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy.26 
The Court did not hold that the woman’s right to terminate her 
pregnancy was absolute.  Instead, the Court said that the state has a valid 
interest in regulating medical procedures in order to safeguard the pregnant 
woman’s health.27  Another significant qualification on the woman’s 
privacy right is the state’s interest in protecting potential life: “[a]t some 
point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently 
compelling to sustain regulation of the factors that govern the abortion 
decision.”28  The Court concluded that the point at which the State’s 
important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother became 
sufficiently compelling was the end of the first trimester because, until then, 
mortality rates for abortion may be lower than for childbirth.  After the first 
trimester, the abortion procedure may by reasonably regulated for the 
purpose of protecting the woman’s health.29  “With respect to the State’s 
important and legitimate interest in potential life,” the Court held that the 
“compelling point is at viability.”30  The Court ruled that the State may 
prohibit abortions that are not necessary to save the mother’s life “or 
health” after the fetus has become viable or, in other words, biologically 
developed to the point that it is capable of sustaining meaningful life 
outside the mother’s uterus.31 
Thus, the Court divided pregnancy into three periods (the famous – or 
infamous – “trimester” scheme).  Under the trimester scheme, states are 
only able to prohibit abortions during the last trimester (after viability) of a 
 
24. Id. at 151. 
25. Id. at 133 n.22. 
26. Id. at 153. 
27. Id. at 154. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 163. 
31. Id. at 163-65. 
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woman’s pregnancy.  Each state, however, must permit any abortions that 
are recommended by a doctor to preserve a woman’s life or health.  Before 
viability, the states may not prohibit abortion.  But, after the first trimester, 
states may regulate the medical aspects of how abortions are performed to 
the extent that such regulations are necessary to protect the health of women 
seeking abortions.  And, during the first trimester, no regulation of 
abortions performed by doctors are permitted whatsoever. 
Justice Rehnquist dissented by arguing that nothing in the language or 
history of the Constitution supported the creation of a sweeping 
constitutional right to abortion, and that the legality of abortion is more 
appropriately left to legislative rather than judicial judgment.32  Justice 
Rehnquist feared that confusion would result from the Court’s utilization of 
a compelling state interest test because “the asserted right to an abortion is 
not ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked 
as fundamental.’”33  He characterized the majority decision as “judicial 
legislation.”34  Justice White, in a separate dissent also joined by Justice 
Rehnquist, saw the decision as “an exercise of raw judicial power.”35  He 
characterized the issue as whether there is a right to an abortion for 
“pregnancies that pose no danger whatsoever to the life or health of the 
mother but are, nevertheless, unwanted for any one or more of a variety of 
reasons—convenience, family planning, economics, dislike of children, the 
embarrassment of illegitimacy, etc.”36  In his view, it did not violate the 
Constitution for states to prohibit abortions that were sought for reasons of 
convenience rather than to protect maternal life or health.37 
In the companion case, Doe v. Bolton,38 which was decided the same 
day as Roe, the United States Supreme Court struck down Georgia’s 
attempt to impose several procedural impediments to obtaining an 
abortion.39  The Georgia statute at issue contained three key procedural 
prerequisites to obtaining an abortion:  hospital setting, hospital committee 
approval, and two doctor concurrence.40  The first requirement was that the 
abortion be performed in a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals, which was a private organization.41  These 
 
32. Id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
33. Id. at 174 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 101 (1934)). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 221 (White, J., dissenting with Rehnquist, J., joining). 
36. Id.  
37. Id. at 222. 
38. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
39. Id. at 193. 
40. Id. at 184. 
41. Id. 
          
2013] PRO-LIFE SPRING 423 
hospitals, however, were only available in fifty-four of Georgia’s one 
hundred and fifty-nine counties.42  The Court reasoned that there was no 
restriction on the performance of non-abortion surgery in unaccredited 
hospitals, which indicated that the requirement was not reasonably related 
to the purpose of the accreditation act because the act did not address 
medical problems peculiar to abortion.43  Similarly, the Court invalidated 
the procedural requirement that a hospital committee approve each abortion 
because it lacked a constitutionally justifiable purpose.44  The Court 
predicated this decision upon its belief that the requirement interfered with 
the woman’s right to receive the medical care that was in her physician’s 
best medical judgment and that such a requirement was redundant with 
regard to the protection of potential life, since the woman’s physician 
already made the relevant diagnosis.45  A third procedural impediment in 
the Georgia statute required the concurrence of two doctors besides the 
woman’s own physician.46  The Court rejected this requirement, reasoning 
that approval by two other physicians had no rational connection to the 
patient’s needs, unduly infringed on the doctor’s right to practice, and was 
unprecedented because no other medical procedure required a similar 
consultation.47  Thus, the Court struck down the Georgia statute.48 
As a result of the sweeping decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court in Roe and Doe, all existing abortion laws in all states were 
effectively invalidated, at least in part.  Faced with the need to revise their 
abortion laws, some states nevertheless retained their original abortion 
statutes.  Other states amended their laws to conform to Roe, but expressed 
hostility to Roe and Doe either by an explicit statement or by including 
provisions that would automatically reenact a statute of the type invalidated 
in Roe if the United States Supreme Court opinion in Roe was reversed or 
overruled by a constitutional amendment.  Most states simply attempted to 
conform their statutes to the standards set out in Roe, sometimes providing 
a graduated scale of regulation for the second and third trimesters. 
Three years after Roe was decided, the Supreme Court addressed, inter 
alia, the issues of spousal and parental consent to abortion.  In Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,49 Missouri’s comprehensive 
 
42. Id. at 192 n.11. 
43. Id. at 193-94. 
44. Id. at 198. 
45. Id.  
46. Id. at 184. 
47. Id. at 198-200. 
48. Id. at 193. 
49. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
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abortion regulation act was declared to be unconstitutional — for the most 
part.50  Again, Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the Court and stated 
that a spousal consent requirement for married women violated a woman’s 
right to privacy inasmuch as it gave their spouses a state-conferred “veto” 
power over their private decisions to have abortion.51  Likewise, a 
requirement of parental consent before an abortion could be performed 
upon an unmarried minor was declared unconstitutional as inconsistent with 
the privacy right of minor women.52  A prohibition of amniocentesis 
abortions was also invalidated.53  The Court, however, upheld a simple 
informed consent requirement and simple medical record keeping and 
reporting requirements.54  Four dissenting justices55 and two concurring 
justices,56 however, separately wrote to emphasize that the parental and 
spousal interests were more substantial than the majority opinion seemed to 
suggest. 
The following year, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
state and federal laws restricting the public funding of abortions.  In Maher 
v. Roe,57 the Supreme Court upheld a Connecticut regulation limiting public 
assistance for abortions — but not childbirth — to those situations certified 
to be medically or psychiatrically necessary.58  The Court rejected the 
argument that the restriction violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment or the right of privacy of indigent women.59  In this 
regard, the Court distinguished the use of state funds to encourage an 
alternative (i.e., childbirth) from the use of criminal sanctions to prohibit 
abortion.60  The Court opined that: 
The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative 
[than abortion], thereby influencing the woman’s decision, but it 
has imposed no restriction on access to abortion that was not 
already there.  The indigency that may make it difficult and in 
some cases, perhaps, impossible, for some women to have 
 
50. Id. at 83-84. 
51. Id. at 74. 
52. Id.  
53. Id. at 75-79. 
54. Id. at 80-81. 
55. Id. at 94-95 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 102 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
56. Id. at 90-91 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
57. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).  
58. Id. at 479-80. 
59. Id. at 470-471. 
60. Id. at 471-75. 
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abortions is neither created not in any way affected by the 
Connecticut regulation.61 
The Court held that funding restrictions do not violate the right of privacy 
and that they are rationally related to legitimate state interests in preserving 
prenatal life.62 
In a companion case, Beal v. Doe,63 the Court upheld a Pennsylvania 
regulation providing state funds only for therapeutic abortions.64  The Court 
rejected the argument that the state law was inconsistent with Title XIX of 
the Social Security Act (“Medicaid”), interpreting Title XIX as neither 
requiring nor forbidding participating states to subsidize elective 
abortions.65  In the third abortion-funding case decided that day, Poelker v. 
Doe,66 the Court upheld the policy of a city-funded hospital restricting the 
performance of elective abortions.67  It affirmed the restrictive policy on the 
grounds that the public entity could opt to use its scarce resources to 
encourage childbirth rather than perform abortions.68 
In 1979, the Supreme Court decided Colautti v. Franklin,69 which held 
that a Pennsylvania standard-of-care requirement designed to ensure 
adequate medical attention for babies whose mothers had undergone 
abortion after the point of fetal viability was unconstitutional as 
interpreted.70  An extremely exacting standard of thoroughness and 
precision in statutory drafting was emphasized, and the Court refused to 
give any benefit to the states’ interpretation of the meaning and purpose of 
the statute.71  The Court concluded that the relevant statute had an 
impermissible purpose of discouraging abortion.72 
That same year in Bellotti v. Baird (II),73 the Supreme Court 
invalidated a Massachusetts statute that provided that a minor seeking an 
abortion had to obtain parental consent before receiving an abortion; if the 
minor was unable to obtain parental consent, she could get an abortion by 
obtaining approval of a state court judge upon showing that the abortion 
 
61. Id. at 474. 
62. Id. at 478. 
63. 432 U.S. 438 (1977). 
64. Id. at 447. 
65. Id.  
66. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).  
67. Id. at 521. 
68. Id. 
69. 439 U.S. 379 (1979). 
70. Id. at 400-01. 
71. Id. at 392-94. 
72. Id. at 401. 
73. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).  
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would be in her best interests.74  Justice Powell announced the decision of 
the Court and rendered a plurality opinion for four justices emphasizing that 
the defect of the Massachusetts law was the requirement that minors notify 
their parents in all cases; provision for secret, ex-parte proceedings in which 
minors might be able to convince the Court of their maturity or need for a 
secret abortion was emphasized by this faction of the Court.75  Four other 
concurring justices, however, took the position that the defect in the 
Massachusetts scheme was the requirement of third party consent (either 
parental or judicial) in all cases.76  Justice White, alone, dissented asserting: 
“[u]ntil now, I would have thought inconceivable a holding that the United 
States Constitution forbids even notice to parents when their minor child 
who seeks surgery objects to such notice and is able to convince a judge 
that the parents should be denied participation in the decision.”77 
In 1980, the Supreme Court decided two cases that reconfirmed that 
public funding of abortion is not required by the Constitution.  In Harris v. 
McRae,78 and Williams v. Zbaraz,79 the Court upheld the congressional 
Hyde Amendments80 and state counterparts, which prohibited the 
expenditure of funds to pay for abortions.81  The arguments that these 
funding restrictions violated the Establishment Clause, the Due Process 
Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause were rejected, and the prior 
analyses in Maher, Poelker, and Beal, were reaffirmed.82  Also, the 
argument that Title XIX requires participating states to subsidize 
“medically necessary” abortions, even though the Hyde Amendment 
prohibits federal reimbursement, was rejected.83 
The next year, in H. L. v. Matheson,84 the Supreme Court upheld a 
Utah law that required doctors performing an abortion upon an unmarried 
minor to notify her parents “if possible” prior to the performance of an 
abortion.85  Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, rejected the 
challenge of an unmarried fifteen year-old minor living at home with, and 
dependent upon, her parents who challenged the statute as violative of her 
 
74. Id. at 651. 
75. See id. at 642-47. 
76. Id. at 653-55 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
77. Id. at 657 (White, J., dissenting) 
78. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
79. 448 U.S. 358 (1980).  
80. Pub. L. 96–123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979). 
81. Harris, 448 U.S. at 326; Williams, 448 U.S. at 368.  Abortions performed to preserve the 
life of the mother or in response to incest were exempt from this funding prohibition. 
82. See Williams, 448 U.S. at 369. 
83. Id. 
84. 450 U.S. 398 (1981). 
85. Id. at 413. 
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constitutional right of privacy.86  The Court emphasized that the Utah 
statute did not authorize parental veto, merely parental notification of the 
minor’s desire for abortion.87  The Court further noted that the statute was 
reasonably flexible (the “if possible” language) and did not preclude the 
possibility that “mature minors” might obtain abortions without parental 
notification upon a showing of their emancipation.88 
In 1983, the Court decided City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Incorporated,89 which invalidated substantial 
proportions of a city ordinance requiring that abortions could only be 
performed in a hospital after the first trimester.90  In its holding, the Court 
emphasized that, as developments in medicines make abortion safer in later 
periods of pregnancy, the constitutional standard enunciated in Roe must be 
adjusted to permit access to those post-first-trimester abortions in low cost 
abortion clinics rather than higher-cost hospitals.91  Another provision, 
which required all minors under the age of fifteen to obtain parental or 
judicial consent for abortion, was invalidated, and the Court emphasized 
that the city could not presume that all minors under the age of fifteen are 
too immature to make an abortion decision or that abortion may never be in 
their best interests without parental approval.92  A detailed “informed 
consent” requirement obligating the attending physician to inform his 
patient of, inter alia, the development of her fetus, possible physical and 
emotional complications that might result from abortion, the availability of 
agencies to provide her with assistance and information regarding birth 
control, adoption and childbirth, and to inform her of the particular risks 
associated with her pregnancy and of the abortion technique to be 
employed, were declared unconstitutional.93  The majority read the statute 
as being an “in terrorem”94 statute intended to discourage abortion rather 
than inform the woman sufficiently to make an intelligent choice about it.95  
A provision requiring a twenty-four hour delay between the obtaining of 
informed consent in the performance of an abortion was invalidated as 
inconsistent with the need for speedy abortions and unnecessary to protect 
 
86. Id. at 400. 
87. Id. at 408-09. 
88. See id. at 408-11. 
89. 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
90. Id. at 452. 
91. Id. at 434-37. 
92. Id. at 440. 
93. Id. at 442. 
94. “In terrorem” is derived from Latin which means “in fear.”  See BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 896 (9th ed. 2009). 
95. See id. at 450-51. 
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informed consent.96  A requirement that fetal remains following an abortion 
are disposed of “in a humane and sanitary manner” was likewise invalidated 
because it was deemed to be unnecessary vague.97  Writing for a six justice-
majority, Justice Powell reaffirmed the fundamental principles of Roe v. 
Wade, and emphasized that the Court would not reconsider the core policy 
decisions made in Roe.98  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, however, authored 
a powerful dissenting opinion, joined by Justices White and Rehnquist, 
criticizing Roe’s trimester doctrine as being “on a collision course with 
itself”99 and embodying “a completely unworkable method of 
accommodating the conflicting personal rights and compelling state 
interests that are involved in the abortion context.”100 
The Court announced its decision in Planned Parenthood Association 
of Kansas City, Missouri, Incorporated. v. Ashcroft101 the same day.  In that 
case, the Court reiterated its holding in City of Akron that statutes requiring 
all abortions performed in the second and third trimester to be done in 
hospitals were unconstitutional.102  But Missouri’s requirement that a 
second physician be present during the performance of post-viability 
abortions was upheld as a constitutionally reasonable method of furthering 
the states compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses.103  
Likewise, a requirement that pathology reports be submitted in all abortion 
cases was upheld as being reasonable on its face and sufficiently related to 
accepted medical standards.104  Similarly, the requirement that minors 
secure parental consent or judicial consent (based on a finding of maturity 
or best interests) before obtaining abortions was upheld in as much as it 
provided an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor could 
demonstrate that she was sufficiently mature to make the decision to have 
an abortion on her own or that the abortion would be in her best interests.105 
Also announced the same day was the decision of the Supreme Court in 
Simopoulos v. Virginia,106 which upheld the conviction of a Virginia doctor 
for violating a Virginia statute making it unlawful to perform an abortion 
 
96. Id.  
97. Id. at 451-52. 
98. See id. at 420. 
99. Id. at 458 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
100. Id. at 454. 
101. 462 U.S. 476 (1983). 
102. Id. at 494. 
103. Id. at 485-86. 
104. Id. at 490. 
105. Id. at 490-91. 
106. 462 U.S. 506 (1983).   
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during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of a hospital.107  Evidence 
indicated that he had performed an illegal abortion on an unmarried minor 
by an injection of saline solution at his unlicensed clinic, that the minor had 
been directed to deliver the fetus in a motel, was not advised to go to a 
hospital when labor began, and aborted the child alone in the motel.108  
Licensed abortion clinics were deemed “hospitals” for purpose of the 
statute, and the Court upheld the requirement that second trimester 
abortions be performed in such licensed facilities.109 
In 1986, the Supreme Court decided Thornburgh v. American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.110 This case involved a Pennsylvania 
statute enacted post-Colautti found invalid — which required that a woman 
be informed of the name of the physician who had performed the abortion, 
the “particular medical risks” of the abortion procedure to be used, the risks 
of childbirth, the possibility of detrimental physical and psychological 
effects of medical assistance, benefits available for childbirth and prenatal 
care, the fact that the father would be liable for assistance in supporting the 
child, and of agencies offering alternatives to abortion.111  Justice 
Blackmun, for the Court, sharply condemned the provisions as designed to 
deter the exercise of freedom of choice.112  A requirement of disclosure of 
facts of fetal development was also invalidated after Justice Blackmun 
characterized them as nothing less than an attempt to discourage abortion 
and intrude into the privacy of the woman and her physician.113  Other 
provisions were impermissibly designed to protect the life and interests of 
the viable fetus subject to abortion.114  The majority also invalidated 
requirements that the physician performing post viability abortions exercise 
the degree of care required to preserve the life and health of an unborn child 
intended to be born alive, that a physician must use the abortion technique 
that would provide the best opportunity for the unborn child to be born alive 
unless it would present a significantly greater medical risk to the woman’s 
life or health, and that a second physician be present during the 
performance of an abortion when the fetus was possibly viable.115  Having 
condemned what it considered the wrongful intent of the Pennsylvania 
legislature, the majority refused to accept the state’s good faith construction 
 
107. Id. at 519. 
108. Id. at 508-09. 
109. Id. at 518-19. 
110. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).   
111. Id. at 772. 
112. Id. at 759. 
113. Id. at 759-63. 
114. Id. at 769-71. 
115. Id. 
          
430 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:415 
of the statute, and found that it required pregnant women to bear increased 
medical risks in order to save viable fetuses, failed to explicitly contain a 
medical-emergency exception, and curtailed the performance of post 
viability abortions — all in contravention of the fundamental right of 
abortion privacy.116  Four justices dissented, including Chief Justice Burger 
— who had joined the majority in Roe that rejected claims that Roe would 
lead to extreme and extensive judicial doctrines protecting abortion.  Chief 
Justice Burger expressed his regret that he had been wrong about such a 
predication, and for the first time, called for reconsideration of Roe v. 
Wade.117 
After Justice Powell’s resignation in 1987, with only eight Justices 
sitting, the Court decided Hartigan  v. Zbaraz118 by an equally divided four-
to-four decision.  The Court affirmed a court of appeals split judgment 
invalidating an Illinois statute requiring physicians to wait twenty-four 
hours after notifying the parents of minors seeking an abortion before 
performing the abortion on the minor.119  The Illinois law incorporated 
exceptions including judicial bypass provisions conforming to the Bellotti 
(II) standards.120 
Akron, Thornburgh and Zbaraz represent the zenith of the intellectually 
turgid, doctrinally rigid pro-abortion jurisprudence as the Supreme Court 
struck down some common-sense regulations of a medical procedure that is 
not only fraught with medical risk, but is extremely perilous to individuals 
— especially vulnerable, desperate young women who discover that they 
have an unplanned, unexpected, or unwanted pregnancy — and to families.  
For a decade and a half, Justice Blackmun, who considered himself to be 
the medical expert on the Court, had successfully pressed the Court to view 
abortion only from the technical-medical perspective of a comparatively 
simple medical procedure and to exclude consideration of the profound 
moral, ethical, pacifist, child-protective, familial, social, cultural, and other 
normative dimensions.  The record of the Court adopting that narrow 
perspective peaked by 1986, and while it re-emerged occasionally in some 
opinions, and while in some areas the abortion doctrine continued to 
expand, the relentless force of the abortion doctrine began to wane fifteen 
years after the Court decided Roe. 
 
116. Id. at 772. 
117. Id. at 785 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
118. 484 U.S. 171 (1987) (per curiam). 
119. See Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 584 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff’d 763 F.2d 1532 
(7th Cir. 1985). 
120. Id. 
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A significant shift in the abortion doctrine occurred in 1989 when the 
Court decided Webster v.  Reproductive Health Services.121  Here, the 
Supreme Court upheld four provisions of a Missouri abortion law that had 
been invalidated by a federal court of appeals and district court.122  The 
Missouri statute included a preamble declaring legislative policy that “the 
life of each human being begins at conception.”123  The lower courts found 
that this official declaration was inconsistent with dicta in Roe, City of 
Akron, and Thornburgh in that a state may not adopt a theory regarding 
when life begins.124  The Court in Webster, however, explained that Roe’s 
dicta only meant that the adoption by a state of such a theory did not justify 
abortion restrictions.125  Moreover, other cases had held that the state is free 
to favor childbirth over abortion.126  Missouri’s provisions prohibiting the 
expenditure of public funds, the use of public facilities, or the work of 
public employees to perform or encourage abortions not necessary to save 
the life of the mother also were upheld under the precedents established in 
Maher, Poelker, and McRae.127  The Court emphasized that a state is not 
required to get or stay in the abortion business, and may restrict the use of 
public resources.128  The majority also accepted Missouri’s interpretation of 
provisions requiring certain medical tests to determine if a fetus of twenty 
weeks gestation or more is viable as not being required if they would be 
medically useless.129  As construed, four justices found that these provisions 
conflicted with the Roe trimester scheme, and proposed to eliminate the 
trimester scheme.130  Four other justices said that the Missouri abortion 
provisions violated the Roe trimester scheme, and should be invalidated.131  
One justice, Justice O’Connor, found that the provisions did not conflict 
with any precedents, and upheld them without deciding whether to revise 
the Roe trimester doctrine.132 
 Webster was the most intensely watched Supreme Court case in 
many years.  More amicus curiae briefs were filed in that case (seventy-
 
121. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).   
122. Id. at 522. 
123. Id. at 504 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. §§ 1.205.1(1)-(2) (1986)). 
124. Id. at 504-05. 
125. Id. at 506-07. 
126. Id. at 506. 
127. Id. at 508-10. 
128. Id. at 509-10. 
129. Id. at 514-21. 
130. Id. at 494. 
131. Id. at 537-38 (Blackmun, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part); Id. at 561 
(Stevens, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
132. Id. at 525-26 (O’Connor J. concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
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eight) than in any previous case heard by the Supreme Court,133 and the 
Court received cartful’s of mail expressing opinions on the involved 
abortion issues.134  While the decision in Webster “turned the corner” and 
unequivocally moved away from the Roe doctrine, the movement was 
small, the judgment of the Court was quite narrow, and the Court did not 
overturn Roe.  But the very fact that the Webster decision was so modest 
and narrow signaled that the era of constitutional adjudication characterized 
by abrupt and profound changes in constitutional doctrine (of which Roe is 
the prime example) was over.  Moreover, the Court clearly signaled that 
more deference would be accorded to state legislatures regarding abortion 
regulations than had previously been permitted by the federal courts under 
Roe. 
In 1990, the Supreme Court extended the trend toward deference to the 
reasonable regulations and restrictions of abortion adopted by state 
legislatures when it decided two parental participation cases: Hodgson v. 
Minnesota135 and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (“Akron 
II”).136  In Akron II, the Court upheld, by a six to three vote, an Ohio law 
generally requiring that a parent be notified twenty-four hours before an 
abortion is performed on a minor child, unless judicial bypass was 
obtained.137  In Hodgson, the Court struck down a two-parent notification 
requirement without a judicial bypass provision,138 but upheld the same 
requirement with a judicial bypass provision.139  Four justices in Hodgson 
indicated that a two-parent notification requirement would be upheld with 
or without judicial bypass on the ground that parental notification is 
distinguishable from, and less burdensome than, a parental consent 
requirement.140  Four justices characterized the two-parent notification as 
irrational because of the prevalence of divorced, separated, and other single-
parent families.141  These justices asserted that it would be unconstitutional 
even with judicial bypass. 142  Justice O’Connor held that a two-parent 
requirement with judicial bypass is constitutional; without judicial bypass, 
 
133. See Susan Behuniak-Long, Friendly-Fire:  Amici Curiae and Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services. 74 JUDICATURE 261, 261 (1991). 
134. Id. at 535 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
135. 497 U.S. 417 (1990).  
136. 497 U.S. 502 (1990). 
137. Id. at 506-07. 
138. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 422. 
139. Id. at 481 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
140. Id. at 479-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
141. Id. at 452 (plurality opinion). 
142. Id..  
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it is unconstitutional.143  The Court had no occasion to decide whether a 
one-parent notification requirement without judicial bypass is 
constitutional. 
In the 1991 decision of Rust v. Sullivan,144 the Court upheld the Title X 
regulations enacted by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the 
“Secretary”) in 1988, which prohibited recipients of federal family planning 
funds from counseling, referring for, encouraging, or promoting abortion, 
and required family planning fund recipients to be financially and 
physically separate from abortion providers.145  In Rust, recipients of the 
federal funds challenged these so-called “gag rules,” but the district court in 
New York and Second Circuit upheld the regulations,146 as did the Supreme 
Court.  Writing for a majority of five justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist first 
held the regulations were not inconsistent with the intent of Congress.147  
Section 1008 of the Family Planning Act (Title X) provides: “[n]one of the 
funds appropriated under this subchapter shall be used in programs where 
abortion is a method of family planning.”148  The interpretation of the 
statute by the agency was entitled to judicial deference, even if it was not 
the only permissible reading of the statute and even though it was not 
identical with the Secretary’s original regulations.149  The General 
Accounting Office and Office of the Inspector General reports of abuses 
(family planning clinics operating in the same facilities as and acting as 
feeders for abortion clinics) provided ample justification for the 1988 
revised regulations.150  Next, the Court concluded that the regulations did 
not raise the sort of grave and doubtful constitutional questions that would 
warrant invalidation of the regulations merely to avoid the possibility that 
the interpretation of the statute under which they could be upheld might be 
unconstitutional.151  Citing Maher and five other abortion funding cases, the 
Court also rejected Petitioners’ argument that the regulations violated the 
First Amendment by discriminating on the basis of viewpoint in prohibiting 
all discussion about abortion.152  The counseling and advocacy restrictions 
 
143. Id. at 461 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment in part).  
144. 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
145. Id. at 177-78. 
146. Id. at 181 (citing New York v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 889 
F.2d 401 (1989)).  
147. Id. at 203.  
148. Id. at 195, n.4. (citing Grants for Family Planning Serv., 42 CFR §§ 59.8(a)(2), 
59.5(b)(1) (1989)). 
149. Id. at 184. 
150. Id. at 187.  
151. Id. at 191.  
152. Id. at 192-94.  
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were merely designed to ensure that the limits of the Title X program were 
properly observed.153  Selectively funding a program to encourage certain 
activities in the public interest, without funding alternative activities or 
programs, is not impermissible viewpoint discrimination.154  For instance, 
“[w]hen Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to 
encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles . . . it was not 
constitutionally required to fund a program to encourage competing lines of 
political philosophy such as communism and fascism.”155  Moreover, the 
regulations did not prohibit pro-abortion counseling and advocacy by Title 
X grantees and off-the-job employees, only such speech for on-the-job 
employees.156  Finally, the Court summarily rejected the petitioners’ 
assertion that the Fifth Amendment protects a woman’s right to choose 
whether to terminate her pregnancy.157  The Due Process Clause only 
restricts governmental deprivation; it does not compel affirmative 
governmental assistance to secure protected liberties.158  “The government 
has no affirmative duty to ‘commit any resources to facilitating 
abortions . . . .’“159  There were three dissenting opinions in Rust.  Justice 
Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, with Justice Stevens separately 
agreeing, would have invalidated the regulations on both statutory and 
constitutional grounds.160  Justice O’Connor would have invalidated solely 
on statutory grounds.161 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,162 the 
Court reached another milestone in its saga of confusing abortion 
jurisprudence.  The Casey decision was closely watched because the parties 
had urged the Court to either entirely overturn or endorse Roe v. Wade.163  
It did neither, but rendered a very long decision (the slip opinion was over 
165 pages) with five separate opinions, none of them supported by a 
majority of the Court on all of the issues.164  Three justices—O’Connor, 
 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 193.  
155. Id. at 194. 
156. Id. at 198-99.  
157. Id. at 201-02. 
158. Id. at 201. 
159. Id. (quoting Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 510 (1989). 
160. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
161. Id. at 223-24 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
162. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
163. See Brief for Respondents at 117, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992) (No. 91-744); Brief for Petitioners and Cross-Respondents at 62, Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (No. 91-744). 
164. See Casey. 505 U.S. at 843-44.  
          
2013] PRO-LIFE SPRING 435 
Kennedy, and Souter—jointly authored the Court’s opinion.165  Some parts 
of the joint opinion were also signed by two justices— Blackmun and 
Stevens—who agreed with the joint opinion on some points and disagreed 
(each in his own separate opinion) on other points.166  Four others 
justices—Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Thomas—agreed with most results 
of the joint opinion, but not with the rationale; all four justices signed two 
dissenting opinions—one written by Chief Justice Rehnquist and the other 
by Justice Scalia.167 
In Casey, the Court upheld four of five challenged Pennsylvania 
abortion regulations.  First, the Court held that Pennsylvania’s informed 
consent requirement was constitutional, but the Court subdivided the 
informed consent provision three ways, and upheld each part with different 
alliances and different analyses.  First, by a vote of eight to one (only 
Justice Blackmun dissenting), the Court upheld the requirement that the 
physician doing the abortion inform a woman of the nature of the 
procedure, health risks involved in abortion and childbirth, and gestational 
age of the unborn child.  Four justices—Rehnquist, White, Scalia and 
Thomas—found that it was valid because it was rationally related to the 
legitimate state interest in assuring that a woman’s consent to abortion be a 
fully informed decision.168  Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter 
concluded that this provision was constitutional because it did not unduly 
burden a woman’s abortion decision.169  Justice Stevens wrote that it was 
valid under the Roe strict scrutiny trimester standard (the highest possible 
standard of review) because it was a “neutral requirement.”170  Justice 
Blackmun, alone, would have held it unconstitutional under strict 
scrutiny.171  That Justice Blackmun, the author of Roe and the most 
aggressive, insistent, passionate defender and expander of the Roe doctrine 
of abortion-on-demand, was alone in his dissent clearly signaled the end of 
an era—the era of automatic Supreme Court protection of, and cheer-
leading for, abortion-on-demand. 
By a vote of seven to two, the Court upheld the requirement that either 
the doctor or an assistant inform the woman of the availability of printed 
materials describing the fetus, giving information about medical assistance 
 
165. Id.   
166. Id. at 844.  
167. Id. at 944, 979. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part) (Scalia, J., dissenting).    
168. Id. at 967 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).  
169. Id. at 881-87 (majority opinion). 
170. Id. at 917-18 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting in part).  
171. Id. at 925-26 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
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for childbirth and child support, and a list of agencies that provide 
alternatives to abortion, including adoption.  The Rehnquist-four again held 
that this was rationally related to the legitimate state interest in assuring that 
a woman’s consent to abortion be a fully informed decision.172  The 
O’Connor-three again concluded that it did not unduly burden a woman’s 
abortion decision because it would not have a “severely adverse” effect on a 
woman’s abortion choice.173  In separate opinions, Blackmun and Stevens 
dissented because the requirement violated precedents decided under the 
strict scrutiny standard of review.174  The mandatory twenty-four hour 
waiting period was upheld by the same fragmented four175 plus three176 
minus one177 minus one178 vote.  The fact that no one would join Justice 
Blackmun’s dissent was evidence that the Blackmun-led era of knee-jerk 
judicial invalidation of abortion restrictions by the Supreme Court was over. 
Second, in Casey, the Court unanimously held that Pennsylvania’s 
medical emergency provision—which provided an exception to certain 
regulations in cases of medical emergencies—was constitutional.  Five 
justices signed the joint opinion agreeing that it did not impose an undue 
burden on access to abortion.179  Four justices wrote that it was valid under 
rational relation analysis as reasonably interpreted by the court of 
appeals.180  Third, Pennsylvania’s parental consent provision was upheld by 
eight votes, and each of the three supporting opinions garnering such votes 
cited the numerous past decisions holding that parental participation 
furthers the important governmental interest in the welfare of minors.181  
Justice Blackmun—again alone—dissented by arguing that the statute was 
unconstitutional under strict scrutiny because it could delay abortions for 
minors.182  Finally, with an eight to one vote, the Court upheld most of the 
 
172. Id. at 966-67 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
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173. Id. at 883-84 (majority opinion).  
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public and confidential reporting and record-keeping requirements by 
simply relying on past precedents.183  Justice Blackmun, alone, dissented.184 
  The only abortion regulation the Supreme Court struck down in 
Casey, by the close vote of 5-4, was Pennsylvania’s spousal notification 
requirement.  The law, which required married women to notify their 
husbands, contained exceptions covering pregnancy by a non-husband, 
sexual assault, inability to locate the husband, fear of physical abuse, or 
medical emergency.185  Nonetheless, the joint opinion, signed this time by 
five justices (the triumvirate186 plus Blackmun187 and Stevens188) concluded 
that it unduly burdened the right of married women to obtain abortions 
because spousal abuse is a serious problem and because mandatory 
notification to a husband of his wife’s desire to have an abortion is 
“repugnant to our present understanding of marriage and of the nature of the 
rights secured by the Constitution”—which protects the rights of 
individuals against families.189  Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, 
Scalia, and Thomas in dissent, would have upheld the requirement by 
distinguishing mere notification from spousal consent, and because spousal 
notification rationally furthers state interests in protecting a husband’s 
interest in the potential life of his unborn child, in protecting the potential 
life of the fetus, and in promoting the integrity of the marriage 
relationship.190 
The joint opinion for the Court in Casey explicitly reaffirmed key parts 
of the Roe doctrine, including the principle that the Constitution protects the 
decision of pregnant women in having abortion (now described as a “liberty 
interest” rather than a “privacy” interest, perhaps because of the 
incoherence of describing as “private” a decision to authorize a medical 
procedure performed by one person, upon another person, that ends the life 
of a third human being), and that direct prohibitions of abortion before the 
fetus is viable are unconstitutional.191  However, the joint opinion also 
explicitly repudiated the trimester scheme and the “overreaching” of some 
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abortion decisions (including Akron I, and Thornburgh),192 and announced a 
new test—the “undue burden” test—to replace the former “strict scrutiny” 
test in abortion cases.193  Two justices, Blackmun194 and Stevens,195 joined 
the joint opinion in reaffirming part of Roe, but declined to repudiate any of 
the prior cases and insisted that the old strict scrutiny test continue to be 
applied.196  Four other justices, Rehnquist, White, Scalia and Thomas, 
explicitly opined that Roe should be entirely overturned and that abortion 
restrictions should be analyzed under ordinary “rational relation” 
analysis.197 
In 1993 and 1994, abortion protests were the subject of the major 
Supreme Court abortion decisions.  In Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health 
Clinic,198 abortion clinics and pro-abortion organizations filed suit in 
federal court against anti-abortion demonstrators and a group that organized 
demonstrations against abortion clinics seeking to enjoin them from 
protesting outside clinics in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area.  The 
plaintiff asserted three claims, including an alleged violation of a federal 
civil rights law that prohibits conspiracy to deprive “any person or class of 
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and 
immunities under the law”199 as well as two pendant state law claims—
trespass and public nuisance.200  The district agreed, and enjoined 
defendants from trespassing or obstructing access to the clinics and ordered 
them to pay plaintiffs’ costs and attorneys’ fees.201  The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed.202  The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated in part.203  
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that women seeking abortions 
do not constitute a “class” protected by the federal statute and that 
opposition to abortion does not constitute animus against women in 
general.204  Justice Scalia wrote, “[w]hatever one thinks of abortion, it 
cannot be denied that there are common and respectable reasons for 
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opposing it, other than hatred of, or condescension toward . . . women as a 
class — as is evident from the fact that men and women are on both sides of 
the issue . . . .”205  Moreover, Justice Scalia emphasized that disfavoring 
abortion was not considered to be ipso facto sex discrimination, and that the 
defendants lacked the required “intent” to discriminate against women 
because their demonstrations were intended to protect the victims of 
abortion, stop abortion, and reverse its legalization.206  The “hindrance” 
prong of section 1985 would fail for similar reasons.207 
Because plaintiffs could not prevail under section 1985, the Bray court 
held that they were not entitled to attorneys’ fees.208  The plaintiff’s federal 
claims, however, were not so insubstantial as to deprive the federal court of 
jurisdiction over the pendant state law claims, so the case was remanded.209  
Concurring, Justice Kennedy noted that another federal statute, 42 U.S.C. 
section 10501 requesting assistance from the U.S. Attorney General, might 
apply.210  Dissenting, Justices Souter (alone),211 Stevens (with Blackmun 
joining),212 and O’Connor (with Blackmun joining),213 filed separate 
opinions asserting disparate interpretations of section 1985 under which the 
defendant’s might have been liable. 
In 1994, the Court decided National Organization for Women, 
Incorporated v. Scheidler,214 which involved another abortion protester 
issue.  Abortion clinics and organizations that support abortion rights filed 
suit in federal court against anti-abortion organizations and individuals 
alleging that they were engaged in a conspiracy in violation of federal 
antitrust laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”).215  The district court dismissed the antitrust claims on the ground 
that the activities involved political action, not commercial competition, and 
dismissed the RICO claims on the ground that, even though the plaintiffs 
alleged predicate illegal acts (such as violation of the Hobbs Act), RICO 
requires an “economic motive” of profit, and the abortion demonstrators 
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lacked such a motive.216  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
dismissal of both counts.217  Reviewing the RICO dismissal only, a 
unanimous Supreme Court reversed, ruling that an “economic motive” for 
profit is not required to allege a violation of RICO.218  The Court ruled that 
the clinics had standing to bring RICO claims because they alleged facts—
i.e., illegal violence was used to shut down the clinic—which, if proved, 
could justify the relief they sought.219  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion 
then held that “[n]owhere in either [section] 1962(c), or in the RICO 
definitions in [section] 1961, is there any indication that an economic 
motive is required.”220  The phrase “affect commerce” was broad enough to 
include acts done without an economic motive.221  In addition, the Court did 
not believe that the term “enterprise” implied that an economic motive was 
required.222  Although the congressional statement of findings prefacing 
RICO refers draining billions of dollars from the economy, that “thin reed” 
of general legislative concern did not suggest that personal benefit to the 
actor was a predicate.223  Congress could have clearly included an economic 
motive requirement, but did not.224  Department of Justice guidelines in 
1981 referring to economic motive were not persuasive because they were 
amended only three years later.225  Finding the statutory language 
“unambiguous” and that the legislative history contained no “clearly 
expressed legislative intent to the contrary” the court rejected the protesters’ 
and lower courts’ construction of the RICO law.226  Justice Souter (joined 
by Justice Kennedy) wrote an additional opinion to emphasize that “RICO 
actions could deter protected advocacy and to caution courts applying 
RICO to bear in mind the First Amendment interests that could be at 
stake.”227 
The same year, in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Incorporated,228 
the Court significantly curtailed a broad injunction that had been issued 
against abortion clinic protesters.229  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the 
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opinion for the Court (part for five justices and part for six justices).230  A 
Florida state court entered an injunction against abortion protestors 
blocking access to an abortion clinic entrances and against physically 
abusing people entering or leaving the clinic.231  Six months later, finding 
that the first injunction had been violated, causing physical harm to some 
persons and discouraging potential patients, the court issued a broader 
injunction including nine restraints.232  The demonstrators objected to four 
of the restrictions on their public expression of opposition to abortion and to 
the abortion clinic.233  The Florida Supreme Court upheld the injunction,234 
but in a separate case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated 
it.235 
The U.S. Supreme Court upheld a few narrow provisions, but held that 
most of the injunction unconstitutionally infringed upon the First 
Amendment rights of abortion protesters.236  The Court first rejected the 
argument that the injunction was content or viewpoint based.237  Next, the 
court stated that, because every injunction singles out a group on the basis 
of its past actions, the failure to similarly enjoin pro-abortion demonstrators 
was not improper because they had not engaged in those disruptive actions; 
the restraint of the demonstrators was “incidental to their antiabortion 
message because they repeatedly violated the court’s original order.”238  
Because the restriction of speech was an injunction rather than a statute, a 
“somewhat more stringent” standard applied (“whether the challenged 
provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than necessary to serve 
a significant government interest”) than would have applied to a statute.239  
But strict scrutiny was not necessary.240  The public sidewalk was a “public 
forum.”241  The Court also agreed that numerous significant governmental 
interests justified an appropriately tailored injunction, including protecting 
property rights, free flow of traffic, public safety and order, protecting 
women’s freedom to seek lawful medical and counseling services for 
pregnancy, and the well-being of the patients.242 
 
230. Id.  
231. Id. at 758. 
232. Id. at 758-61. 
233. Id. at 768-76. 
234. Id. at 761. 
235. Id. at 761-62. 
236. Id. at 776.  
237. Id. at 763-64. 
238. Id. at 763. 
239. Id. at 765. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. at 764. 
242. Id. at 767-68. 
          
442 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:415 
The Court, however, concluded that most of the challenged provisions 
of the injunction were overbroad.  First, the injunction prohibited protestors 
from “congregating [or] picketing” within 36-feet of most of the clinic 
property.243  The thirty-six feet buffer zone was reasonable as applied to 
clinic driveways and entrances because the court found (and respondents 
did not contest) that demonstrators had repeatedly blocked both.244  Second, 
the court held that as applied to bar demonstrators from picketing on 
adjacent private property, absent any evidence any traffic was blocked, the 
thirty-six foot buffer zone “fail[ed] to serve the significant governmental 
interests” and was stricken.245  Third, the court upheld the injunction 
barring “singing, chanting, whistling, shouting, yelling, use of bullhorns, 
auto horns, sound amplification equipment or other sounds . . . within 
earshot of the patients inside the clinic” during clinic hours because noise 
can create stress and health risks in a medical setting.246  The injunction 
also prohibited protesters displaying “images observable . . . [by] patients 
inside” the clinic, but the Court found that the proper remedy if patients 
found visual images displayed by protesters disturbing was for the clinic to 
“pull its curtains,” and the Court held that this provision “violate[d] the 
First Amendment.”247  The injunction also prohibited protesters from 
approaching any person within a three hundred foot bubble zone around the 
clinic unless invited by the person to do so.248  The Supreme Court, 
however, struck this because the prior consent requirement was 
impermissible and this provision “burden[ed] more speech than is necessary 
to prevent intimidation and ensure access to the clinic.”249  Finally, the 
injunction prohibited picketing or using sound amplification equipment 
within a three hundred foot bubble zone of the residences of clinic staff.250  
The Court upheld the sound equipment restriction, but struck down the 
picketing ban because the three hundred foot zone was much greater than 
necessary to protect the neighborhood.251  Moreover, the court rejected the 
challenge to the “in concert” language in the injunction for lack of standing, 
noting that freedom of association to express a viewpoint was permitted, 
but collaboration to deprive others of lawful rights was not.252  Justice 
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Souter joined the Court’s opinion, but added that claims against those 
acting “in concert” would be decided on a case-by-case basis without regard 
to viewpoint.253  According to Justice Stevens, he would: apply a lower 
standard of review to injunctions than to statutes;254 uphold the three 
hundred foot bubble zone against unbidden approaching because 
“approaching” is conduct as well as speech;255 and refrain from deciding the 
other issues (though Justice Stevens was “inclined to agree with the Court’s 
resolution respecting the noise and images restrictions.”).256 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, agreed with the 
Court’s invalidation of portions of the injunction, but would have gone 
further and invalidated the entire injunction.257  They first argued that the 
injunction “departs so far from the established course of our jurisprudence 
that in any other context it would have been regarded as a candidate for 
summary reversal.”258  These three justices would hold the application of 
the thirty-six foot zone and noise restriction “to [anti-abortion protestors] 
alone” is impermissible.259  After describing a video of the demonstrations, 
Justice Scalia emphasized that the Florida judge that issued the injunction 
himself acknowledged that the injunction was limited on the basis of 
viewpoint.260  The Court’s “intermediate-intermediate” standard of review 
was a departure from accepted prior restraint standards.261 
Justice Scalia also disputed the assertion that the first injunction had 
been violated, noting that the evidence only showed that the flow of traffic 
had been slowed a little, not a finding of any intentional blocking of traffic, 
and just one incident in which the protestors “took their time to get out of 
the way.”262  Moreover, the pro-abortion protestors made more noise than 
the anti-abortion protestors, and the injunction was not the narrowest 
possible restraint.263  As a result, all nine justices agreed that at least some 
parts of the injunction were unconstitutionally overbroad infringements of 
free speech.  Six justices agreed that at least some parts of the injunction 
were constitutionally permissible.264  Three justices would have overturned 
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the entire injunction as violating the First Amendment.265  Only one justice, 
Stevens, would have upheld more of the injunction than the Court 
upheld.266  Thus, Madsen was a major turning point in the abortion 
jurisprudence of the Court, finally signaling that the Court was clearly 
willing to extend ordinary First Amendment protections to the rights of 
expression of anti-abortion protesters. 
In Leavitt v. Jane L.,267 the Court reversed a Tenth Circuit decision that 
had ruled that a Utah abortion law was not severable under Utah law and 
was unconstitutional in its entirety.268  A federal district court invalidated 
part of the Utah law restricting abortions before twenty weeks gestation, but 
upheld the part of the law that restricted abortions after twenty weeks 
gestation, finding that the latter portion was severable under state law.269  
While the Supreme Court normally does not review interpretations of state 
law, this decision amounted to such a blatant federal court nullification of 
clear state law allowing severability that a five to four majority of the Court 
ruled, per curiam, that the law was severable, and the Court remanded the 
case for further proceedings.270 
In Lambert v. Wicklund,271 the Court, per curiam, reversed the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals and a United States district court that invalidated a 
Montana parental notice law.272  The law at issue required that one parent 
be notified forty-eight hours before performance of an abortion unless a 
court waived the requirement on showing that: (1) the minor was 
“sufficiently mature,” or; (2) she had been the victim of a pattern of parental 
physical, sexual, or emotional abuse, or; (3) parental notification was “not 
in the best interests of the minor.”273  When doctors challenged the law, the 
district court struck it down, finding that the third possible waiver was too 
narrow because it did not specify that the waiver could be judicially granted 
when abortion was not in the minor’s best interest—not just when 
notification was not in the minor’s best interest.274  The court of appeals 
placed heavy reliance on its earlier decision in Glick v. McKay,275 in which 
the court had invalidated Nevada’s parental notification rule on similar 
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grounds.276  The Supreme Court noted that its prior decisions had never 
determined whether judicial bypass is necessary when the statute merely 
requires parental notification (instead of parental consent), criticized the 
Glick decision, and found that the “best interests” exception encompassed 
both the benefits from abortion and harm from notification.277  The Court 
observed that Akron II was based upon an assumption that a judicial bypass 
when notification is not in the minor’s best interest “is equivalent to” 
judicial bypass based on showing “that abortion is not in her best 
interests . . . .”278  Justice Stevens, joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, 
concurred because the Montana statute was “essentially identical” to the 
statute upheld in Akron II, but noted that either “best interest” showing 
would justify judicial bypass, a showing of both was not necessary.279 
In Mazurek v. Armstrong,280 the Court, per curiam, also upheld a 
Montana law restricting the performance of abortion to licensed physicians, 
which was similar to laws in forty other states.281  The district court denied 
a motion for preliminary injunction when a physician-assistant and several 
doctors challenged the law.282  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated 
that judgment, finding the plaintiffs had a fair chance of success on the 
merits.283  Here, the Supreme Court reiterated its determination in Casey 
that there was no evidence that requiring a doctor to perform the abortion 
amounted to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.284  It 
also rejected the Court of Appeals conclusion that the law was invalid 
because the legislature had impermissibly intended to create such an 
obstacle, noting the absence of proof of that alleged motive; the fact that an 
anti-abortion group drafted the law did not mean the legislature had illegal 
motive.285  The Court’s precedents dating back to Roe v. Wade had upheld 
similar requirements.286  While reversal of an interlocutory judgment is 
unusual, because the error was clear and the effect in Montana immediate, 
the Court reversed.287  Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and 
Breyer, dissented, arguing that the error was not sufficiently important to 
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justify interlocutory review and finding that the law was aimed specifically 
at one person—the physician-assistant—and designed to make abortion 
more difficult.288 
From 1973 until the late 1990s, the Court declined to review restraints 
on anti-abortion free speech in cases that seemed to be contrary to prior 
rulings of the Court.  In Lawson v. Murray, the Court denied a petition for 
certiorari from a New Jersey prior restraint order against anti-abortion 
protestors picketing within three hundred feet of the residence of an 
abortion provider, even though the court found that the picketing was 
peaceful and all tort claims against the protestors had been denied.289  Just 
the year before in Madsen, the Court had explicitly struck down an 
injunction against picketing within three hundred feet of the residence of 
abortion clinic staff under the justification that the injunction was 
overbroad.290  Scalia’s concurrence warned that the suppression of the First 
Amendment rights of pro-life activists was developing “more quickly and 
more severely than . . . feared,”291 and he cautioned that “[t]he danger that 
speech-restricting injunctions may serve as a powerful means to suppress 
disfavored views” especially when “the defendant’s prior speech (and 
proposed future speech) has been expressly found not to constitute a crime 
or common law tort.”292 Nonetheless, he concurred in denying certiorari 
because of a technical problem and because he was convinced that anti-
abortion protesters are “the currently disfavored class” of litigants in the 
Supreme Court.293 
Three years later, in Lawson v. Murray,294 the Court again denied 
certiorari in a reincarnation of the same case.  In this case, a New Jersey 
court enjoined peaceful pro-life picketers “from carrying signs with 
generalized anti-abortion messages, and signs identifying the respondent as 
an abortionist” alongside a public street in front of the large, well-set-back 
home of an abortion doctor, except for picketing by small groups “no more 
than one hour every two weeks, and only if the police department is given 
[twenty-four] hours’ notice.”295  No “violence, disruption of traffic, or other 
tortious or unlawful activity” had been threatened or had occurred.296  
Concurring in the denial of certiorari, Justice Scalia commented that the 
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injunction “makes a mockery of First Amendment law” and imposed “a 
degree of restriction upon free speech that [wa]s unparalleled in the 
opinions of this Court.”297  However, the “captive audience” doctrine again 
made it difficult to reach the prior restraint issue, and he warned that pro-
life protestors could not expect to receive protection for their First 
Amendment rights from the current Court: “experience suggests that 
seeking to bring the First Amendment to the assistance of abortion 
protesters is more likely to harm the former than help the latter.”298 
In 2000, the Court decided another major freedom of expression case, 
Hill v. Colorado.299  In this case, pro-life abortion protestors sought a 
declaratory judgment and injunction against a Colorado statute that forbade 
anyone from knowingly approaching within eight feet of another person 
without that person’s consent for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill 
to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling 
with such other person within one hundred feet of an abortion clinic.300  The 
state courts denied relief on motion for summary judgment,301 but, in 1997, 
the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration 
in light of Schenck.302  The state courts again upheld the statute,303 and the 
Supreme Court affirmed, six to three.  Justice Stevens wrote the majority 
opinion.  He distinguishing Schenck, and found the statute to be “content-
neutral,” a valid “time, place and manner” regulation, not overbroad, not 
unreasonably vague, and not a prior restraint.304  However, four of the 
justices in the majority—Souter, O’Connor, Ginsberg, and Breyer—signed 
a separate concurring opinion, which emphasized somewhat different 
perspectives, including the importance of the state interest in protecting 
people in the one hundred foot zone.305  Justice Scalia, joined by Justice 
Thomas, dissented, and  characterized the majority decision as an attack on 
fundamental individual expression rights, noting that,”[h]aving deprived 
abortion opponents of the political right to persuade the electorate that 
abortion should be restricted by law, the Court today continues and expands 
its assault upon their individual right to persuade women contemplating 
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abortion that what they are doing is wrong.”306  Justice Kennedy separately 
dissented, complaining that the holding “contradicts more than a half 
century of well-established First Amendment principles.  For the first time 
the Court approves a law which bars a private citizen from passing a 
message, in a peaceful manner and on a profound moral issue, to a fellow 
citizen on a public sidewalk.”307 
The same day that Hill was announced, the Court also decided the 
controversial case of Stenberg v. Carhart.308  Here, by a vote of five to four, 
the Court affirmed the ruling of the lower federal courts—which had ruled 
that a Nebraska statute banning “partial birth abortion”309 was 
unconstitutional.310  Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for the Court, and 
found the statute unconstitutional because it did not contain an exception 
for the life of the mother311 and because it unduly burdened the right to 
abortion because it might be interpreted to apply to ordinary abortion 
procedures.312  Three of the justices in the majority also signed concurring 
opinions.  Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg each filed a concurring 
opinion and joined in each other’s opinion.313  Justice O’Connor filed a 
separate concurring opinion.314  All four dissenters filed separate opinions.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that he considered Casey wrongly decided 
and wrongly applied in this case.315  Justice Scalia argued that the “undue 
burden” test was unworkable, and called for overruling Casey.316  Justice 
Kennedy, joined by Rehnquist, argued that the statute put no undue burden 
on abortion.317  Justice Thomas, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice 
Scalia, asserted that the majority failed to interpret the statute according to 
its plain meaning, and the statute was capable of a narrowing 
construction.318 
In 2006, the Supreme Court decided two other significant abortion 
cases.  Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England,319 
concerned the New Hampshire Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act, 
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which required forty-eight-hour prior notification by a doctor to parents of a 
minor before performing an abortion on the minor unless the doctor found 
that the abortion was necessary to save her life, but it also allowed a minor 
to petition a court for judicial bypass (approval of abortion without parental 
notification if the minor is mature or the abortion is in her best interests).320  
The federal district court agreed with Planned Parenthood’s claim that the 
Act was unconstitutional because it did not allow a doctor to perform an 
abortion without parental notification if necessary to protect the health of 
the minor, and the court enjoined its enforcement.321  The Supreme Court 
unanimously vacated and remanded, noting that the record showed that the 
number of cases in which the law might be unconstitutional as applied was 
so small that it was not clear that the law would be facially 
unconstitutional.322 
In Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Incorporated,323 the 
Court reversed and remanded lower federal courts judgments finding that 
Scheidler and other anti-abortion protesters had violated RICO and ordering 
them to pay damages and enjoining them from engaging in anti-abortion 
protests anywhere in the country.324  The Supreme Court ruled that physical 
violence unrelated to robbery or extortion falls outside RICO’s (Hobbs Act) 
scope because Congress did not intend to create a freestanding physical 
violence offense.325  It did intend to forbid acts or threats of physical 
violence in furtherance of a plan or purpose to engage in what the Act refers 
to as robbery or extortion (and related attempts or conspiracies), which were 
not proven in this case.326 
In 2007, the Supreme Court issued two major decisions related to 
abortion.  In Gonzales v. Carhart,327 the Court upheld a federal law 
prohibiting “partial birth abortion.”328  The five to four majority opinion of 
Justice Kennedy emphasized that Casey had vindicated the government’s 
strong interest in protecting prenatal human life and the brutal and 
 
320. Id. at 323-24 (citing N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 132:24-132:28 (2004)). 
321. Id. at 325 (citing Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Heed, 296 F. Supp. 2d 59, 65 
(D.N.H. 2003)). 
322. Id. at 332.  The New Hampshire legislature repealed the law after the Supreme Court 
decision.  See Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Ayotte, 571 F. Supp. 2d 265 (D.N.H.  2008).  
323. 547 U.S. 9 (2006). 
324. Id. at 14-15 (detailing the procedural history and factual background of the case). 
325. Id. at 17-23. 
326. Id. at 23 (explaining, “Congress did not intend to create a freestanding physical violence 
offense in the Hobbs Act.  It did intend to forbid acts or threats of physical violence in furtherance 
of a plan or purpose to engage in what the statute refers to as robbery or extortion (and related 
attempts or conspiracies).”).  
327. 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
328. Id. at 133. 
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gruesome method of partial birth abortion clearly implicated that important 
state interest.329  The Court distinguished Stenberg v. Carhart, holding that 
the federal law was neither void for vagueness nor an undue burden on the 
right to abortion because the federal law was drafted more narrowly than 
the Nebraska, applying only to “intact D&E abortions” and not D&E 
abortions generally, specific anatomical marks were included rather than 
vague “substantial” language, an additional “overt act” to kill was required, 
and the law contained a scienter requirement, and accidental D&E was not 
covered.330  The federal law did not impose a “substantial obstacle” to late-
term pre-viable abortions, and women’s regrets coupled with doctor 
reluctance to disclose details of this abortion method justified the state 
regulation.331  The lack of a health exception was acceptable because both 
Congressional findings and the differing lower court opinions indicated that 
there is uncertainty in the medical community about whether such method 
of abortion was ever necessary to protect maternal health.332  A facial attack 
should not have been entertained in the first instance, but an as-applied 
challenge may be brought.333 
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, joined the Court’s opinion “to 
reiterate . . . that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence, including Casey and 
Roe . . . has no basis in the Constitution.”334  Justice Ginsburg, joined by 
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, caustically dissented, finding the case 
indistinguishable from Stenberg.335  The dissenters wrote: 
Today’s decision is alarming. It refuses to take Casey and 
Stenberg seriously. It tolerates, indeed applauds, federal 
intervention to ban nationwide a procedure found necessary and 
proper in certain cases by the American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists (ACOG). It blurs the line, firmly drawn in 
Casey, between previability and postviability abortions. And, for 
the first time since Roe, the Court blesses a prohibition with no 
exception safeguarding a woman’s health.336 
While the majority opinion in Gonzales was very cautious, focused, and 
narrow, and upheld a very popular regulation, it involved a matter of 
extreme controversy (late-term abortions). 
 
329. Id. at 157-58.  
330. Id. at 147-49, 151-55.  
331. Id. at 159-60.  
332. Id. at 162-67.  
333. Id. at 167. 
334. Id. at 168-69 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
335. Id. at 169-70, 187 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
336. Id. at 170-71.  
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In a collateral decision, Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin 
Right to Life, Inc.,337 the Supreme Court upheld an “as applied” challenge to 
section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“McCain-Feingold”), 
which barred electioneering advertisements within thirty days of a federal 
primary or sixty days of a federal election as applied to three ads that 
Wisconsin Right to Life (“WRTL”) intended to run less than sixty days 
before an election in which Senator Feingold was running.338  The 
advertisements asked citizens to call his office to ask him not to filibuster 
President Bush’s judicial nominees, which the Court agreed were 
constitutionally protected political speech issue advertisements, not 
electioneering or the “functional equivalent.”339  The Court found no 
compelling state interest justified burdening WRTL’s speech.340  While this 
case did not concern the abortion doctrine per se, the context concerned 
abortion speech, an area of law in which the Court had, in some past cases, 
clearly distorted First Amendment doctrine with the effect, if not purpose, 
of suppressing pro-life speech.  This decision was an overdue re-balancing 
of the Court’s earlier reluctance to protect anti-abortion speech and a 
counter-balancing of its earlier broad endorsement of the McCain-Feingold 
political speech restrictions. 
There has been no major Supreme Court abortion decision since 2007.  
However, the free-speech rights of abortion protestors are still in 
controversy.  For example, in Snyder v. Phelps,341 the Court ruled that 
protests at funerals of military personnel killed in action by members of the 
Westboro Baptist Church, led by Pastor Fred Phelps, who demonstrate to 
express their belief that God punishes the United States and its military 
personnel because the United States tolerates homosexuality, could not give 
rise to a tort judgment for damages for offending members of the fallen 
soldier’s family.342  Here, the Court approved but distinguished its rulings 
allowing government-imposed buffer zones at abortion clinics, noting that 
although it had approved a similar injunction that required a buffer zone 
 
337. 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
338. Id. at 455-57.  The Court explained:  
Section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) makes it a 
federal crime for a corporation to use its general treasury funds to pay for any 
“electioneering communication,” 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2), which BCRA defines as any 
broadcast that refers to a candidate for federal office and is aired within 30 days of a 
federal primary election or 60 days of a federal general election in the jurisdiction 
where that candidate is running, § 434(f)(3)(A). 
Id. 
339. Id. at 456-57. 
340. Id. at 477. 
341. 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). 
342. Id. at 1219-20. 
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between protestors and an abortion clinic entrance in Madsen v. Women’s 
Health Center, Inc.,343 the facts of Snyder were “obviously quite different” 
in respect to both “the activity being regulated and the means of restricting 
those activities.”344  At this point, it was clear that the Court was unable to 
break the prejudiced habit of considering abortion protests at clinics to be 
sui generis with limited First Amendment protection.345 
In the fall of 2012, the Court issued a per curiam opinion in Lefemine v. 
Wideman,346 providing that a pro-life protester was entitled to collect 
attorney’s fees as a prevailing party.347  Lefemine and other pro-life 
protestors held a demonstration at a busy intersection in a town in South 
Carolina in which they held up signs of aborted fetuses.348  When some 
citizens complained about the graphic pictures, county police ordered 
Lefemine to discard the signs or be ticketed for breach of the peace, which 
eventually led him to disband the protest.349  A year later when the 
protestors’ attorney notified the police that they intended to engage in a 
similar demonstration and asserting their right to use the signs picturing 
aborted fetuses without interference, the Chief of Police defended the prior 
police action and promised it would be repeated if the signs were used.350  
Lefemine filed a section 1983 civil rights action seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief and nominal damages.351  The federal court granted the 
injunction, declared that defendants had violated Lefemine’s rights, but 
denied monetary damages (under qualified immunity as the rule of law had 
been uncertain), and denied his request for attorney’s fees.352  The Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that winning the injunction and 
declaratory judgment did not make Lefemine a “prevailing party.”353  The 
Supreme Court disagreed, and vacated and remanded the judgment.354  
Because Lefemine had succeeded in removing the threat to his right to 
demonstrate with the signs, he had achieved a “material alteration in the 
parties’ relationship” and thus satisfied the test for being a “prevailing 
 
343. 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
344. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1218. 
345. After all, since the abortion doctrine is entirely a judicial creation, why should 
opponents think that they have the right to express opposition to or disagreement with such a 
divinely-created doctrine, especially at the temples of that doctrine? 
346. 133 S. Ct. 9 (2012) (per curiam). 
347. Id. at 11-12. 




352. Id.at 10-11 (citing Lefemine v. Davis, 732 F. Supp. 2d 614, 620-25 (D.S.C. 2010)). 
353. Id. at 11 (citing Lefemine v. Wideman, 672 F.3d 292, 302–03 (4th Cir. 2012)). 
354. Id. at 12. 
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party” entitled to recover his attorneys’ fees, absent “unjust” exceptional 
circumstances that had not been shown.355  While this did not involve 
abortion rights or doctrine, it continues the line of cases suggesting that the 
Court no longer is always hostile to protecting the First Amendment rights 
of pro-life protestors, apart from clinic protests. 
The Court has been dealing with certiorari petitions regarding 
restrictions on pro-life speech for at least twenty years.356  In 2012, the 
Court granted certiorari and summarily reversed Lefemine v. Wideman, 
which involved a fee dispute arising from a challenge to such a 
restriction.357  Lower courts have been dealing with such restrictions for 
nearly forty years; accordingly, the Supreme Court’s affirmation that free 
speech rights extend to pro-life protesters comes none too soon.358 
Consequentially, the great bulk of the Supreme Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence has been to strike down any pre-natal protection or other 
legislation that might restrict, impede, or discourage a pregnant woman’s 
decision to get or have access to an abortion.  The few minor, collateral 
exceptions (mostly in the past fifteen years) mostly related to finally (after 
more than two decades of ignoring and upholding repression of pro-life free 
speech) extending nearly normal protections to free expression by pro-life 
advocates.  Apart from those few peripheral and collateral issues (primarily 
regarding funding and parental notice), the Court for four decades has 
steadfastly protected, preserved, expanded, and reinforced the core 
principles of the abortion doctrine by invalidating any laws that 
significantly burden, encumber, inhibit, hamper, or delay access to abortion 
on demand. 
III. PRO-LIFE SPRING OF 2011-2013 
Since 2010, there has been a notable eruption in pro-life legislation, 
which reflects public repugnance about excesses, abuses and scandals 
 
355. Id. at 11-12. 
356. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Cloer v. Gynecology Clinic, Inc., 528 U.S. 
1099 (2000); Lawson v. Murray, 525 U.S. 955 (1998); Williams v. Planned Parenthood Shasta-
Diablo, Inc., 520 U.S. 1133 (1997); Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110 (1995); Winfield v. 
Kaplan, 512 U.S. 1253 (1994).  The Court has also reviewed a few such laws.  See Schenck v. 
Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 
U.S. 753 (1994). 
357. Lafemine, 133 S. Ct. at 10. 
358. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jarboe, 12 Pa. D. & C.3d 554, 561 (C.P. Cumberland. 
1979); O.B.G.Y.N. Ass’n v. Birthright of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc., 407 N.Y.S.2d 903, 906 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1978); Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80, 84 (Colo. 1975) (en banc). In cases in which the 
restrictions have been found to be content-neutral, they were thus subject only to intermediate 
scrutiny. See, e.g., Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-25; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 763-68. Other cases have arisen 
in nonpublic fora, where the government power to restrict speech is broader. See, e.g., Ctr. for 
Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 455 F.3d 910, 920 (9th Cir. 2006).  
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involving unregulated abortion-on-demand.  The research arm or ally of 
Planned Parenthood, the Alan Guttmacher Institute, reports that in 2012-
2013 many abortion regulations were introduced, and some enacted.  These 
include: 
(1)    Abortion bans to replace Roe, have been introduced in 
nineteen states, enacted in North Dakota and Arkansas, passed 
one chamber in Montana. 
(2)    Abortion clinic regulation, requiring all or some abortion 
providers to have hospital privileges or a transfer agreement 
with a hospital, have been introduced in nine states, enacted in 
Alabama, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, and Wyoming. 
(3)    Specific regulation of abortion providers in particular have 
been introduced in ten states, enacted in Alabama, Indiana, 
North Carolina, and Texas, passed one chamber in Minnesota. 
(4)    “Choose Life” license plate laws have been introduced in 
four states, vetoed in Rhode Island. 
(5)    State funding of alternatives to abortion services have been 
introduced in seven states, enacted in Kansas, Michigan, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas. 
(6)    Insurance coverage of abortion laws concerning abortion 
coverage in health plans offered through health exchanges.  
Introduced in seventeen states and enacted in Arkansas, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.  Passed one chamber in 
Minnesota. 
(7)    Private insurance coverage of abortion bills have been 
introduced in eleven states and enacted in Kansas, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina.  Passed at least one chamber in 
Georgia and Wisconsin and adopted by the state board in 
Georgia. 
(8)    Public funding of abortion for low-income women has been 
introduced in nine states.  Enacted in Arkansas, Iowa, and 
Maryland. 
(9)    Required abortion coverage has been introduced in two 
states.  Passed one chamber in Washington. 
(10)   Late-term abortion legislation including “partial birth” 
abortions laws, post-viability abortions regulations or specified 
gestational period abortions regulations have been introduced 
in one form or another in seventeen states.  Specific 
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gestational period abortions enacted by Arkansas, North 
Dakota, and Texas. 
(11)   Bills to mandate counseling and waiting periods before 
abortion including self-directed counseling that includes 
information that the fetus can feel pain (two states) and 
information that the fetus is a person (two states), have been 
Introduced in seven states.  Enacted in Ohio and Kansas.  
Passed one chamber in Indiana.  Also, state-directed 
counseling followed by a waiting period, including requiring a 
woman to make two trips to the clinic (two states).  These 
have been introduced in fourteen states.  Enacted in South 
Dakota.  Passed one chamber in Kentucky. 
(12)   Medication abortion regulations have been introduced in ten 
states and enacted in Alabama, Indiana, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, and Texas.  Adopted by 
the state board in Iowa. 
(13)   Parental involvement in minor’s abortion regulations have 
been popular.  Parental consent requirements have been 
introduced in eight states.  Enacted in Arkansas, Montana, and 
Oklahoma.  Parental notification requirements have been 
introduced in seven states.  The Illinois Supreme Court upheld 
a 1995 law requiring parental notice. 
(14)   Physicians liability for abortions regulations have been 
introduced in five states, and Enacted in Kansas and Montana. 
(15)   Physicians-only requirement for surgical and medical 
abortions have been introduced in eleven states and enacted in 
Indiana, Alabama, Louisiana, Missouri, and North Dakota, and 
adopted by a state board in Iowa. 
(16)   Laws prohibiting coercing a woman into having an abortion 
have been introduced in five states and enacted in Louisiana 
and Montana. 
(17)   Laws forbidding sex and race selection abortions have been 
introduced in seventeen states and enacted in Kansas, North 
Carolina, and North Dakota.  Such bills have passed one 
chamber in Florida and Wisconsin.359 
 
359. Monthly State Update: Major Developments in 2013, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1, 
2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/. 
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Clearly there has been a lot of legislative activity in the states concerning 
abortion.  Some of these laws are designed to facilitate abortion, but most 
are designed to prevent abortion abuses, exploitation, and dangerous, 
potentially harmful practices. 
A. NORTH DAKOTA ABORTION-REGULATION LEGISLATION ENACTED 
IN 2013 
In 2012-2013, the North Dakota legislature led the nation in enacting 
laws regulating abortion.  Among those new abortion laws are Senate Bill 
2305,360 requiring physicians performing abortion procedures to have 
hospital admitting privileges; House Bill 1456,361 prohibiting the 
performance of abortions of unborn children when a heartbeat is 
detected; Senate Bill 2368,362 establishing the state’s compelling interest in 
the unborn human life from the time that unborn child is capable of feeling 
pain; House Bill 1305,363 prohibiting abortions for the purpose of sex 
selection or because of genetic abnormalities detected in the fetus; 
and Senate Concurrent Resolution 4009,364 a concurrent resolution to create 
and enact a new section of the Constitution of North Dakota relating to the 
inalienable right to life of every human being at every stage of 
development.  Two other bills relating to abortion were introduced in the 
North Dakota legislature in 2013 but did not pass.  Senate Bill 2303 
proposed to amend the definition of “human being”365 and Senate Bill 
2302366 proposed to prohibit abortions except when necessary to save the 
life of the pregnant woman. 
Senate Bill 2305 amended subsection one of North Dakota Century 
Code section 14-02.1-04 to read: 
An abortion may not be performed by any person other than a 
physician who is using applicable medical standards and who is 
 
360. S.B 2305, 63rd Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 
14-02.1-04(1) (2013)). 
361. H.B. 1456, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 
14-02.1-05.2(1) (2013)). 
362. S.B. 2368, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 
14-02.1-05.3(1) (2013)). 
363. H.B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 
14-02.1-04.1(1) (2013)). 
364. S. Con. Res. 4009, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013). 
365. S.B  2303, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013).  This bill passed the second 
reading in the Senate, but failed the second reading in the House.  See Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. for 
Prelim. Inj. at 2, MKB Mgmt. Corp., v. Stenehjem, No. 1:13-CV-071 (D.N.D.  July 19, 2013).  
366. S.B. 2302, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013).  This bill failed the second 
reading in the Senate.  See Resp. in Opp’n to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. at 2, MKB Mgmt. Corp., v. 
Stenehjem, No. 1:13-CV-071 (D.N.D.  July 19, 2013). 
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licensed to practice in this state. All physicians performing 
abortion procedures must have admitting privileges at a hospital 
located within thirty miles [42.28 kilometers] of the abortion 
facility and staff privileges to replace hospital on-staff physicians 
at that hospital. These privileges must include the abortion 
procedures the physician will be performing at abortion facilities. 
An abortion facility must have a staff member trained in 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation present at all times when the 
abortion facility is open and abortions are scheduled to be 
performed. 367 
The statute is largely unremarkable except for the fact that the need for such 
basic regulations of the provision of medical services of any kind is 
noteworthy.  That fact may reveal something disturbing about the lack of 
self-regulation within the abortion industry.  The validity of the principle 
that doctors performing abortion must be licensed to practice in the state in 
which he or she is performing abortions and should have admitting and staff 
privileges at a hospital within reasonable proximity of the place of abortion 
seem reasonable in light of the record of abortion complications, injuries, 
and even deaths that have occurred with tragic frequency.368  The state 
interest in protecting the medical safety of the provision of abortion services 
in its jurisdiction is indisputable.369  However, the group of doctors most 
likely to perform abortions, the American Congress of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (“ACOG”), has issued a statement in which they have voiced 
their disapproval of a law requiring admitting privileges, thinking the law is 
singling out abortion providers, asserting: 
ACOG opposes legislation or other requirements that single out 
abortion services from other outpatient procedures. For example, 
ACOG opposes laws or other regulations that require abortion 
providers to have hospital admitting privileges. ACOG also 
 
367. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04(1) (2013) (emphasis added).  
368. See John Hurdle & Trip Gabriel, Philadelphia Abortion Doctor Guilty of Murder in 
Late-Term Procedures, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2013, available at 
http://www nytimes.com/2013/05/14/us/kermit-gosnell-abortion-doctor-found-guilty-of-
murder html?_r=0 (describing abortionist convicted of numerous violations of law, causing death 
of adult woman patient and of killing several born-alive fetuses). 
369. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 161 (2007)  (upholding abortion 
regulations of intact D & E abortions to protect medical safety of abortion); Ayotte v. Planned 
Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 327-39 (2006) (parental involvement statutes are 
permissible to protect the health and other interests of minors and parents); Mazurek v. 
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 974-75 (1997) (“[W]e emphasized that our prior cases ‘left no doubt 
that, to ensure the safety of the abortion procedure, the States may mandate that only physicians 
perform abortions.’“) (quoting Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 447 
(1983)).  
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opposes facility regulations that are more stringent for abortion 
than for other surgical procedures of similar low risk.370 
The last part of the ACOG statement seems to reveal the motive and 
purpose—ACOG wants to insure that abortion procedures are not treated 
differently than any other procedures of similar risk to the patient.  
Moreover, ACOG also “believes physicians who provide medical and 
surgical procedures, including abortion services, in their offices, clinics, or 
freestanding ambulatory care facilities, should have a plan to ensure prompt 
emergency services if a complication occurs and should establish a 
mechanism for transferring patients who require emergency treatment.”371  
So ACOG provides no principled medical or professional basis for 
opposition to laws like the North Dakota law from a medical perspective, 
only a political concern that abortion not be “single[d] out”372 for more 
regulation than other procedures of similar medical risk.  Of course, 
abortion involves such serious moral, religious, and ethical concerns that 
are really not comparable with most therapeutic medical procedures or even 
most other elective, non-therapeutic procedures.  At the end of July 2013, a 
state court judge granted a temporary restraining order barring enforcement 
of House Bill 2305’s hospital admission privileges for doctors performing 
abortions in North Dakota.373 
House Bill 1456 requires that a physician “may not perform an 
abortion on a pregnant woman before determining, in accordance with 
standard medical practice, if the unborn child the pregnant woman is 
carrying has a detectable heartbeat,”374 and bars abortion of a child with a 
heartbeat unless necessary to save the life or “to prevent a serious risk of the 
substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the 
pregnant woman, or to save the life of an unborn child.”375  Texas,376 
Ohio,377 and Arkansas378 have introduced or enacted bills that are 
 
370. Statement on State Legislation Requiring Hospital Admitting Privileges for Physicians 
Providing Abortion Services AM. CONG. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (Apr. 23, 
2013), 
http://www.acog.org/About%20ACOG/News%20Room/News%20Releases/2013/Hospital%20Ad
mitting%20Privileges%20for%20Physicians%20Providing%20Abortion%20Services.aspx.   
371. Id.  
372. Id. 
373. Woman’s Safety Law Enjoined by Fargo Judge, N.D. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE (July 31, 
2013),  http://ndcatholic.org/latestnews/?cat’4. 
374. H.B. 1456, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 
14-02.1-05.2(1) (2013)). 
375. H.B. 1456, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.D. 2013) (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 
14-02.1-05(2)(a) (2013)). This section also makes it a class C felony for a physician to violate this 
provision. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-05(4) (2013). 
376. H.B. 59, 83d Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2013).  
377. H.B. 125, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011).  
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substantially similar to the North Dakota bill, while Oklahoma requires 
doctors to inform women that they can hear the heartbeat of their unborn 
child (at eight weeks or later gestation) if they so choose.379  At least two 
other state legislatures also have considered fetal heartbeat bills.380  A 
federal district court granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement 
of North Dakota House Bill 1456 and Senate Bill 2305.381 
House Bill 2368 enacted four new provisions of the North Dakota 
Century Code governing performance of abortions by: 1) requiring the 
doctor performing the abortion to attempt to ascertain “the post-fertilization 
age of the unborn child”;382 2) prohibiting the abortion of an unborn child of 
twenty or more weeks post-fertilization age;383 3) requiring the facility to 
record the probable post-fertilization age of the aborted unborn child, the 
method of abortion used, whether intra-fetal injunction was used,384 and; 4) 
protecting the anonymity of the woman upon who abortion is performed.385  
This new law took effect August 1, 2013 and no efforts to judicially enjoin 
enforcement of it were filed.386  House Bill 1305, amending section 14-
02.1-02 of the North Dakota Century Code, bans sex-selection abortions 
and abortions done because the unborn child has an actual or potential 
genetic abnormality (such as Trisomy 23).387  The abortion clinic in North 
 
378. S.B 134, 89th. Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 20-16-1304 (2013)).  This restriction has since been held unconstitutional.  See Edwards v. 
Beck, No. 4:13CV00224 SWW, 2014 WL 1245267 (E.D. Ark. March 14, 2014). 
379. S.B. 1274, 53rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2012) (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-
745.14 (2012)). 
380. H.B. 2324, 2013 Leg. Sess. (Kan. 2013); H.B. 97, 62d Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2013).  
See also Laura Hancock, Wyoming House Panel Votes Down Abortion Bill, WYO. STAR TRIB., 
Jan. 29, 2013, available at http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/wyoming-
house-panel-votes-down-abortion-bill/article_bb56bab3-9ce9-5b40-a968-559b0e155e07 html.  
381. See generally Latest News, Updated Status on Abortion Legislation – September 13, 
2013, N.D. CATHOLIC CONF. (Sept. 13, 2013),  http://ndcatholic.org/latestnews/?p=1714 
(hereinafter “Updated Status”).  
382. S.B. 2368, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 3 (N.D. 2013) (codified at N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 14-02.1-05.3(2) (2013)). 
383. Id. § 4 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-05.3(3) (2013)). 
384. Id. § 5 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-07 (2013)).  Abortions that are 
performed in violation of these section are punishable as a class C felony and actionable civilly by 
the mother or father of the unborn child aborted.  See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-05(4) (2013). 
385. Id. § 7 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.3 (2013)). 
386. See generally Updated Status, supra note 381. 
387. H. B. 1305, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess., § 2 (N.D. 2013) (codified at N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 14-02.1-04.1 (2013)  
1.  Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a physician may not intentionally 
perform or attempt to perform an abortion with knowledge that the pregnant woman is 
seeking the abortion solely: a. On account of the sex of the unborn child; or b. Because 
the unborn child has been diagnosed with either a genetic abnormality or a potential 
for a genetic abnormality. 
Id. 
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Dakota originally filed suit to enjoin enforcement of this new law, but it 
later withdrew its legal challenge.388   
Senate Concurrent Resolution 4009 proposed to amend the North 
Dakota Constitution by added a new section to Article 1.  It would read as 
follows:  “The inalienable right to life of every human being at any stage of 
development must be recognized and protected.”389  The legislature passed 
the proposed the amendment; now it must be voted upon by the people of 
North Dakota during the general election to be held on November 4, 
2014.390 
The North Dakota abortion legislation is not unique.  At least six other 
states have passed or introduced bills with similar regulations.  Wisconsin 
passed a bill that has as its first section wording almost verbatim to that of 
the North Dakota laws; that is that the physician must have admitting rights 
to a hospital within thirty miles of the abortion location.391  Similar to the 
North Dakota law, a federal judge has enjoined enforcement of the law for 
four months.392  A trial is set for November 25, 2013 in the case in which 
Planned Parenthood is the party challenging the law.393 
 Texas passed House Bill 2, which was scheduled to come into effect 
at the end of October, 2013.394  The admitting privileges and the hospital 
proximity are the same as in North Dakota.395  It is reported that this new 
law has already caused seven abortion clinics to announce that they will 
probably have to shut down because of the restrictions.396 
 
388. See Updated Status, supra note 381.  
389. S. Con. Res. 4009, 63d Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess.(N.D. 2013).   
390. See Updated Status, supra note 381.  
391. See S.B. 206 § 1(2), 2013 Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Wisc. 2013) (codified at WIS. 
STAT § 253.095 (2013). 
392. See Todd Richmond, Federal Judge Blocks Admitting Privileges Mandate in New 




394. H.B. 2, 83d Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. (Tex. 2013) (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 171 
(2013)). 
395. Id. (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 171.0031(2013)).  The admitting privileges 
provision has since been upheld.  See Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Serv. v. 
Abbot, No. 13–51008, 2014 WL 1257965 (5th Cir. March 27, 2014).  The Texas bill also states 
that abortions are no longer allowed after twenty weeks unless a threat to the life of the mother is 
present or serious abnormalities to the child.  Id. (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 171.044 
(2013)). 
396. See Brittney Martin, Some Texas Abortion Clinics Prepare to Shut Down After New 
Law, DALLAS NEWS, Sept. 4, 2013, available at 
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/headlines/20130904-some-texas-abortion-clinics-
prepare-to-shut-down-after-new-state-law.ece. 
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The North Carolina legislature has created a bill similar to this North 
Dakota law.397  In addition, it also requires that the physician must remain 
with the patient throughout the entire procedure and during the recovery 
period.398  The North Carolina Legislature has codified this proposal.399 
Alabama House Bill 57 was passed by the legislature and sent to the 
governor in April,400 and the governor signed the bill into law on or about 
April 18, 2013.401  This bill does not specify a proximity requirement, but 
indicates that the person performing the abortion must have admitting 
privileges at a hospital within the same metropolitan statistical area as the 
facility where the abortion occurs.402  Additionally, the bill declares: 
“[a]bortion not only involves a surgical procedure with the usual risks 
attending surgery, but also involves the taking of human life.”403 
Mississippi enacted a law similar to Senate Bill 2305404 that took effect 
in 2012.405  While the Mississippi law does not have a proximity 
requirement, it provides that the physician performing the abortion must 
have admitting privileges to a hospital.406  This could be very significant 
because Mississippi only has one abortion clinic.  It has been speculated—
perhaps overly-optimistically/pessimistically—that the law could make 
Mississippi the first elective-abortion-free state in the nation.407  Kansas 
enacted a law in 2011 as part of their state budget, similar to the North 
Dakota law.408  It requires that a physician performing an abortion must 
have admitting privileges to a hospital that is within a thirty-mile radius of 
their facility.409 
 
397. Amend Women’s Right to Know Act, S.B. 308, 2013 Leg., Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
(N.C. 2013), 
398. Id.  
399. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.82 (2013). 
400. See H.B. 57, 2013 Leg., Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ala 2013). 
401. John Shyrock, Gov. Bentley to sign HB 57 Abortion Bill Tuesday, WSFA COM., Apr. 8, 
2013, http://www.wsfa.com/story/21913097/gov-bentley-to-sign-hb-57-abortion-bill-tuesday.  
402. H.B. 57 § 4(c), 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2013) (codified at ALA. CODE § 26-23E-4(c) 
(2013)). 
403. Id. at § 2(4) (codified at ALA. CODE § 26-23E-2(4) (2013)). 
404. H.B. 1390, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2012) (codified at MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-75-
1(f) (2012)). 
405. See, Governor Phil Bryant Signs House Bill 1390, GOV. PHIL BRYANT (Apr. 16, 2012), 
http://www.governorbryant.com/governor-phil-bryant-signs-house-bill-1390/. 
406. Id. 
407. See generally Sarah Kliff, In Mississippi, a new push to end abortion, WASH. POST, 
Mar. 13, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/in-mississippi-a-new-push-
to-end-abortion/2012/03/13/gIQAz5PAAS_blog html (“Abortion-rights advocates say it’s unclear 
whether they would be able to find a doctor with the credentials required by this new law.  If they 
can’t, and this bill becomes law, Mississippi’s one abortion clinic would close.”). 
408. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4a09(d)(3) (2011). 
409. Id. 
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B. REASONS FOR THE PRO-LIFE SPRINGTIME OF 2011-2013 
Many causal influences might be identified as contributing to the pro-
life spring at the beginning of the twenty-first century, particularly in the 
first three years of the second decade of this century.  Nonetheless, three 
factors in particular may have been the most influential in providing the 
catalyst for pro-life legislation: (1) some shocking abortion scandals; (2) the 
adoption and implementation of President Obama’s unpopular, broad 
healthcare law (dubbed “Obamacare”) including its contraceptive (qua 
abortifacient) mandate; and (3) growing sense that there are many ways to 
avoid and prevent the tragedy of unwanted pregnancy and better 
alternatives than abortion. 
There have been several shocking scandals (including deaths of 
patients) involving abortion, abortion clinics, and abortion doctors in recent 
years.  The most recent, and extremely deplorable, was the conviction of 
Philadelphia’s Dr. Kermit Gosnell for the deaths of born-alive aborted 
fetuses and injuries to their women submitting to abortions at his hands.  As 
one report summarized: 
Late-term abortionist Kermit Gosnell was convicted Monday of 
first-degree murder in the deaths of three infants who were born 
alive after botched abortions performed in his run-down West 
Philadelphia clinic. He was also found guilty of involuntary 
manslaughter in the death of Karnamaya Mongar, a 41-year-old 
woman who died from an overdose of anesthetic drugs during an 
abortion procedure. 
The jury’s deliberations came after six weeks of harrowing 
testimony detailing the brutal deaths of newborns and unthinkable 
mistreatment of women. These murders followed failed abortions 
performed after Pennsylvania’s 24-week limit. 
In addition to the four murder charges, Gosnell was also convicted 
of more than 200 other criminal counts including violating 
Pennsylvania’s informed consent law and performing illegal late-
term abortions.410 
One of the babies Dr. Gosnell killed in his clinic he said was so big it 
could “walk to the bus.”411 
 
410. Sarah Torre, Morning Bell:  Serving Justice to Gosnell, HERITAGE FOUND., May 14, 
2013, http://blog heritage.org/2013/05/14/morning-bell-serving-justice-to-gosnell/.  
411. Steven Ertelt, Kermit Gosnell Receives Third Consecutive Life Term for Killing Baby, 
LIFENEWS.COM, May 15, 2013, http://www.lifenews.com/2013/05/15/kermit-gosnell-receives-
third-consecutive-life-term-for-killing-baby/. 
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Gosnell was convicted . . . of first-degree murder in the deaths of 
three babies born alive after an abortion process that involved 
jabbing them in the neck with scissors . . . . Gosnell gave up his 
right to appeal the verdict that found him guilty on three of the 
four first-degree murder charges he faced. As a result, prosecutors 
agreed to two life terms in prison and Gosnell would not face the 
death penalty.412 
 While the Gosnell trial was underreported by mainstream media, what 
little got into the press was galvanizing.  As the New York Times reported: 
In the witness box, clinic employees said live births occurred 
regularly, and they believed Dr. Gosnell’s explanation for snipping 
necks with surgical scissors — to “ensure fetal demise” — was 
accepted practice in late-term abortions. An abortion doctor who 
testified for the prosecution said such practice was unheard of. 
One witness, Steven Massof, testifying under a plea agreement to 
avoid first-degree murder charges, instructed jurors to feel the 
backs of their own necks and said, “It’s like a beheading.” 
Another former employee, Adrienne Moton, sobbed as she 
described the death of Baby A, aborted when his teenage mother 
was about 29 weeks pregnant. Ms. Moton was so upset she took a 
cellphone photograph of him, which was shown in court. She said 
Dr. Gosnell had joked that the baby was big enough to walk to a 
bus stop. 
Ms. Moton, who also testified under a plea agreement, said she cut 
the neck of Baby D, who was delivered into a toilet while its 
mother, given a large dose of a drug to dilate the cervix, waited for 
Dr. Gosnell to arrive. 
Another clinic worker said she followed Dr. Gosnell’s instructions 
and cut the neck of Baby C after it moved an arm. The doctor told 
her was an “involuntary movement.”413 
Such negative publicity (and the Gosnell case is just the most recent 
notorious example of many) reveals the ghastly practices and callous ethics 
of the abortion business and probably has contributed to the pro-life 
legislative boom in the past few years. 
 
412. Id. 
413. John Hurdle & Trip Gabriel, Philadelphia Abortion Doctor Guilty of Murder in Late-
Term Procedures, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2013, available at 
http://www nytimes.com/2013/05/14/us/kermit-gosnell-abortion-doctor-found-guilty-of-
murder html. 
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Second, the attempt (so-far successful) by President Obama to expand 
medical insurance by forcing insurers, employers, and covered employees 
to implement insurance coverage for elective abortions has provoked a lot 
of controversy.414  “The mandate forces employers, regardless of their 
religious or moral convictions, to facilitate insurance coverage for abortion-
inducing drugs, sterilization and contraception under threat of heavy 
penalties.”415  The government coercion coupled with the controversy has 
breathed new life into pro-life efforts. 
Third, awareness of alternatives that can prevent the need for abortion 
also seems to have grown.  Pregnant women today generally are not so 
naive and easily exploitable as to be misled into thinking that their dilemma 
is an abortion-or-bear-and-raise-an-unwanted-child scenario.  Attitudes of 
Americans about abortion have stabilized in the past fifteen years.  As 
responses to the question “[w]ith respect to the abortion issue, would you 
consider yourself to be pro-choice or pro-life?” indicate, Gallup reports that 
from 1998 to 2013 the percentage of Americans self-identifying as pro-life 
has ranged from 45% to 51%, while the percentage of Americans self-
identifying as pro-choice has ranged from 41% to 51%.416  For the past five 
years, (since 2009) pro-life advocates have tied or exceeded pro-choice 
proponents nearly all the time and in nearly every year.417 
Likewise, more Americans believe that abortion is morally wrong than 
believe that it is morally acceptable.  The Gallup data reveals that 49% of 
Americans think that abortion is morally wrong as opposed to 42% that 
think it is morally acceptable.418  The Gallup Poll reports as of May, 2013 
show that 52% of the Americans surveyed believe that abortion should be 
“legal only under certain circumstances,” while only 26% believe that 
abortion should be “legal under any circumstances” and 20% believe that it 
 
414. See, e.g., Jeffrey Young, Obamacare Provokes 21 States Into Banning Abortion 
Coverage By Private Health Insurers, HUFFPOST POLITICS, Sept. 3, 2013, 
http://www huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/03/obamacare-abortion-coverage_n_3839720 html; 
Defend Religious Liberty – Stop Forced Abortion Pill Coverage, AM. CENTER L. & JUST., 
http://aclj.org/obamacare/defend-religious-liberty-stop-forced-abortion-pill-coverage; Terrence P. 
Jeffrey, Obama Orders Catholics to Act Aginst Their Faith; Bishops Call it ‘Unconscionable’, 
CNSNEWS.COM, Jan. 22, 2012, http://cnsnews.com/news/article/obama-orders-catholics-act-
against-their-faith-bishops-call-it-unconscionable.  
415. Abby Carr, 26 Religious Colleges Take Stand Against Abortion-Pill Mandate, 
CHARISMANEWS, Apr. 15, 2013, http://www.charismanews.com/us/39081-26-religious-colleges-
take-stand-against-abortion-pill-mandate. 
416. Abortion, GALLUP, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx (last 
visited May 2, 2014). 
417. Id. 
418. Id. 
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should be “illegal in all circumstances.”419  Likewise, a July 2013 report by 
the PewResearch Religion & Public Life Project confirms that public 
opinion has been remarkably stable for the past twenty years, with minor 
vacillations holding steady (when given two choices only – “legal in 
all/most cases or illegal in all/most cases”) at about 55% pro-choice and 
about 45% pro-life.420 
Even general public media occasionally have acknowledged that most 
Americans are pro-choice regarding early abortions and hard-case abortions 
only, but that most Americans are pro-life regarding elective abortions, 
especially after the first trimester of pregnancy.  As an article in the 
Washington Post in 2011 reported: 
Except in the first few years after Roe v. Wade made abortion 
legal, when public acceptance grew, sentiment around the issue 
has not moved much. Nor is there a large generational divide. 
That distinguishes abortion from other contentious social issues, 
such as same-sex marriage and marijuana legalization, where 
overall public opinion — led by the young — has shifted 
dramatically in favor of a more liberal position. 
For decades, polls have shown that most people want abortion to 
be available to women, at least in the early stages of pregnancy, 
when the vast majority occur. 
But Americans get increasingly uncomfortable with the procedure 
as a fetus gets closer to viability. In December, a Gallup poll found 
roughly six in 10 saying abortion should be legal in the first three 
months of pregnancy, but support dropped to 27 percent in the 
second trimester and to 14 percent in the third. 
Data just released by the National Opinion Research Center show 
that most Americans think the woman’s decision to have an 
abortion is justified in some instances — rape (where 78 percent 
support abortion as an option), fetal deformity (77 percent) and 
serious danger to her health (87 percent), for example. But they do 
not support it when an abortion is sought because the woman 
believes she is too poor to have more children (a situation in which 
 
419. Id.  The other two percent had “no opinion.”  Id.  The minor differences in the pro-life 
and pro-choice percentages in answer to these questions reveals both the difference to some 
respondents that the phrasing of the question may make in the results.  But they also reveal 
general, strong consistency in the pro-life and pro-choice designations. 
420. Public Opinion on Abortion Slideshow, PEWRESEARCH (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://features.pewforum.org/abortion-slideshow/. 
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45 percent say they approve of an abortion) or doesn’t want to 
marry the father (42 percent).421 
IV. THE COMING OF ANOTHER WINTER OF REPRESSION FOR 
PRO-LIFE PUBLIC LEGISLATION AND ACTIVITY 
Political seasons like the climatic seasons of the year change.  It would 
be unrealistic to believe that any one season will last forever.  The recent 
enactment of many pro-life laws by various state legislatures signals the end 
of a social winter season of casual acceptance and tolerance of horrific 
killing of pre-natal human life and human lives.  That season may be 
passing, or at least waning.  For example, in MKB Management 
Corporation v. Burdick,422 the United States District Court of North Dakota 
granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the fetal heartbeat 
bill, North Dakota House Bill No. 1446.423  A similar Texas abortion law 
also was enjoined by a trial court,424 but the U.S. Court of Appeals 
suspended that judicial restraint.425 
However, the new springtime of pro-life values and legislation will 
also be temporary.  That should motivate persons with serious, strong pro-
life values to accomplish as much as they can in this short season.  It should 
sober them to act carefully and enact laws that are likely to survive 
challenge and to endure even when the favorable season ends and pro-
abortion values and actors again are dominant. 
V. CONCLUSION:  ROSES IN WINTER 
The darkness of Winter may become our habitual and natural 
environment.  As Emily Dickinson wrote: “[w]e grow accustomed to the 
Dark –/ When Light is put away.”426  It is in human nature to adjust to and 
accommodate to living in current circumstances.  So, if we are not wary, 
abortion-on-demand may be normalized, routinized, accepted even by 
 
421. Karen Tumulty, Four decades after Roe v. Wade, views of most Americans still 
complex, conditional, WASH. POST, July 10, 2013, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/abortion-fights-test-public-
ambivalence/2013/07/10/eb75aa92-e8ad-11e2-8f22-de4bd2a2bd39_print html. 
422. 954 F. Supp. 2d 900 (D.N.D. 2013). 
423. Id. at 914. 
 424. Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Serv. v. Abbott, 951 F.Supp.2d 
891 (W.D. Tex. 2013), stay granted in part, 734 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013),  judgment reversed in 
part, No. 13–51008, 2014 WL 1257965 (5th Cir. 2014). 
425. See generally Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Serv. v. Abbot, No. 
13–51008, 2014 WL 1257965 (5th Cir. 2014). 
426. Emily Dickinson, We grow accustomed to the Dark –(428), POETRY FOUND., 
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/246776.  Dickinson also wrote “Either the Darkness alters 
-/ Or something in the sight / Adjusts itself to Midnight -/ And Life steps almost straight.”  Id.  
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Americans with basically pro-life values as they live is a pervasively pro-
abortion society that habituates all of its members, all men, women and 
children, to the ethic of abortion-on-demand (if the term can correctly be 
applied to abortion-on-demand).  Some believe that it already has become 
generally accepted in American society. 
North Dakota’s bouquet of pro-life laws enacted in 2013 is a reminder 
of the Spring of pro-life values and activities.  May North Dakota’s actions 
set an example that will be followed by lawmakers and officials in other 
states and in the branches, agencies and officials of the United States.  
Perhaps this Pro-life Spring can last a little longer. 
 
